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Abstract 
Education Investments and Returns in Economic Development 
This paper reviews several themes in the economic literature on education 
and development: (1) intercountry evidence on how income, price, and 
demographic constraints govern public expenditures on schools, (2) alternative 
conceptual interpretations of the relationship between education, productivity, 
and income, (3) uncertainties underlying the micro econometric evidence on the 
private and social returns to schooling in the labor market, which can 
generally be classified as model misspecification arising because of either the 
omission of appropriate controls or the neglect of potential sources of sample 
selection bias, (4) indications of the returns to schooling in nonrnarket 
production of child health, education, and fertility control, primarily 
associated with the education 0£ women who perform most of these activities in 
the home, and finally (5) evidence on how the allocation and management of 
public educational resources influence the efficiency with which these services 
are produced and the distribution of resulting private benefits among persons. 
Many aspects of these relationships are poorly understood. Because in practice 
only a few of the many proposed complicating features of human capital models 
can be implemented simultaneously, assigning priorities for further research is 
imperative. Among the numerous gaps in knowledge surveyed in the paper some 
can be closed with focused microeconometric empirical research using existing 
methods, and are likely to occur with the increasing supply of household survey 
and census data for low income countries. Other questions remain unanswered 
for lack of a specification of the dynamic aggregate interplay between the 
supply of investments in the formation of human capital and the modern sources 
of the derived demand for the skills that education produces. Progress on this 
latter frontier of the field is equally important, but less certain. 
This paper was prepared for the Handbook of Development Economics, edited 
by H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, to be published by North Holland Publis~ing
Co., Amsterdam, Netherlands. I greatly appreciate the comments on an earlier 
draft by J. Behrman, N. Birdsall, C. Griffin, W.E. Huffman, J.L; Moock, T.W. 
Schultz, T.N. Srinivasan, J. Strauss and the research assistance of Paul 
McGuire and Andrew Yuengert. 
I. Introduction and Preview 
The record of sustained modern growth in real per capita income cannot be 
accounted for by the accumulation of conventional units of physical capital or 
by the increased application of hours of labor per capita (Kuznets, 1966).1/ 
The sources of modern economic growth are sought instead in the changing 
quality of labor and capital, in the more comprehensive accounting of other 
inputs, and in change of organization, policy environment, or technology 
(Denison, 1962; T.W. Schultz, 1963; Kuznets, 1966). 'While the issues 
surrounding the accounting of aggregate economic growth are unresolved and 
research strategies in this field remain controversial (Griliches, 1970; 
Nelson, 1981), research on various aspects of the microeconomic relationship 
between education and development has expanded rapidly, forging a consensus on 
questions for study and appropriate methodologies to address these questions. 
Studies across persons, households, farms, and firms have documented, first 
generally in the United States and then in many low-income countries, strong 
empirical regularities between educational attainment of persons and their 
productivity and performance in both market and nonmarket (home) production 
activities. If these relationships are causal, and education enhances the 
productivity of labor, it is not surprising that governments have shown a 
willingness to expend a considerable fraction of national income on public 
education; neither is it difficult to understand why parents have set aside an 
increasing amount of their private income to school their children, foregoing 
also the productive contribution the children would have made to family income 
had the children not attended school. The expansion in world demand for 
education is, thus, broadly consistent with schooling investments that earn a 
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high social and private return. Empirical microeconomic studies have ./ 
simultaneously refined and extended the base of evidence that the more educated 
do indeed receive more income and produce more output ·than the less educated in 
a wide range of activities. (Psacharopoulos, 1985; Jamison and Lau, 1982)\;°fThis 
microeconomic perspective explains the motivation of public groups and private 
individuals to supply resources to produce schooling services on the 
expectation that the rates of return warrant the investment. 
If the value of education is thus seen as primarily determined in the 
marketplace, and the recent expansion of education is attributed to an increase 
in returns to schooling, then the challenge remains to explain why the returns 
to schooling have recently been bid up. What accounts in the aggregate for the 
shift outward in the derived demand for educated labor? What particular recent 
developments have boosted the payoff to investing in education, not only for an 
elite, but increasingly for the rank and file of the population? Education is 
highly valued not only for males entering the labor force, but for females 
whether or not they are likely to work outside the home. Hypotheses have been 
advanced to explain this phenomenon, relating it to the dynamic economic 
conditions that create opportunities in the form of disequilibria that are 
exploited more effectively by an educated population (T.W. Schultz, 1975). But 
testing these hypotheses that explicate the initial cause for the spread of 
education is intrinsically difficult. Mass education may be at the very 
origins of modern economic growth, a process that has only in the last fifty 
years spread notably beyond Europe, areas of European settlement, and Japan. 
This essay surveys a small part of the extensive literature on the linkages 
between education, productivity, and development, and assesses several areas 




The expansion of public educational systems worldwide has provided the 
average child in every country with increased years of schooling during the. 
period 1960 to 1983.1/ The gap between high and low income countries in 
educational opportunities has narrowed, relatively and absolutely; the wide gap 
between the educational attainment of women and men has also narrowed, on 
average. This chapter presents an economic interpretation of this educational 
explosion and what has governed the process. Most of the growth in public 
expenditures on education is attributed to increases in growth of real income 
per adult. The income elasticity of public expenditures on primary and 
secondary education are 1.4 and 1.5, respectively. The declining price of 
teacher salaries relative to average incomes is the second major engine of 
education growth, which lowers the unit costs of providing schooling to a 
growing fraction of the child population. These tendencies appear to have been 
partially frustrated by rapid population growth which increases the proportion 
of the population in school ages. This population growth effect does not 
appear to have restrained enrollments at the primary level but eroded the 
resources available per student at both the secondary and primary levels. 
Certain regions have increased public expenditures on education more 
rapidly or more slowly than would have been expected, based on incomes, cost of 
teachers, and population distribution. East Asia and Africa are in this regard 
overachievers while South and West Asia and Latin America are investing less in 
education than is expected on the basis of this framework. 
At the individual level the positive relationship between the education of 
a worker and his or her earnings helps to account for the noted expansion of 
national educational systems. Under certain conditions, the proportionate 
increase in average lifetime wages associated with a year's education 
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approximates an internal private rate of return to investing a year's time in 
that form of schooling. Many empirical studies confirm the nature of this 
relationship, and proceed to estimate the private returns to education in 
developing countries. They show that basic primary and secondary schooling 
yields private returns between ten and forty percent, and generally somewhat 
lower at university or college levels. No pronounced differences are noted 
between men and women. Much of the returns to schooling for women arise from 
their increased productivity in nonmarket production, as evidenced in their 
ability to improve the health of family members, produce a more nutritious diet 
for the same outlays, and control more effectively their reproduction. 
Needless to say, this empirical regularity between schooling and wages can 
be approached using a variety of more complicated econometric methods. 
Although additional controls and the choice of model structure influence 
estimates of the partial association between schooling and wages, the evidence 
to basic education areevaluated below supports the view that private returns 
substantial. 
to students for the full cost of providing themFew countries charge fees 
with educational services. Social returns to schooling after deducting the 
unreimbursed public expenditures on schools are, therefore, lower than the 
private rates of return. Particularly for higher education, where the public 
cost of providing a student with instruction may be 50 times larger than at the 
primary level, the social rates of return in some developing countries may be 
insufficient to warrant further expansion of subsidized public higher 
education. This is rarely the case at the primary and secondary level. 
Management of the educational sector seeks to promote an efficient and 
equitable use of public and private resources. Beyond the broader 
generalizations that can be applied to the financing and expansion of the 
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education sector, there are many country-specifc issues that are not pursued 
here. Most of these issues can be analyzed with econometric methods where 
labor force survey and census data are available for estimating the relative 
benefits of various types of education, and school input and output data are 
available to evaluate the efficiency of school systems to produce what the 
labor market demands in the way of skills. 
Problems: C~nceptual and Empirical 
The empirical evidence supporting education's effect on factor productivity 
must be approached critically, however. At one level, there is innate 
skepticism born of casual empiricism and nurtured on the richness of 
alternatiye theoretical models; economists can propose many models to 
accommodate the stylized fact that elites are often relatively well educated 
and relatively well paid. At another level, the statistical evidence on 
education's productive roles is never ideal, because data on the "consequences" 
of education are obtained from populations in which educational attainment is 
The social sciencesnot randomized but is itself an economic choice variable. 
are rarely able to perform social experiments. Therefore, statistical studies 
of how education affects individual behavior and performance can be biased or 
misleading, because of the nonrandom selection of comparisons groups, the 
omission of other factors, the simultaneity among outcomes variables, such as 
wages, and potential determinants of these outcomes, such as job tenure, and, 
of course, measurement error and flaws of functional form approximations that 
are assumed in statistically estimating group differences associated with 
education. 
There are also palpable differences between the formation of concrete 
physical capital and the accumulation of productive skills in schools. In the 
former case, land is improved by drainage or irrigation, railways are built, 
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and factories are constructed, from which productive services are derived that 
can usually be priced in a competitive marketplace. In the latter case, 
people of different ability attend schools of varied quality, and then they 
perform diverse and often incomparable tasks. It is frequently difficult to 
infer the marginal productivity of workers, and the selection of those that 
report a wage may subtly bias comparisons. Other workers may be employed in 
production teams or families, or within large integrated firms where the 
Markets for theproductivity of the individual is not readily monitored. 
services of labor may not be competitive in the sense of spot markets that 
clear in the short run; labor markets may be further linked to other imperfect 
factor markets, such as those for land and credit, in the case of agriculture. 
(See chapters by Bell and Rosenzweig in this Handbook.) Although similar 
problems exist in the evaluation of the services of heterogeneous physical 
capital, many comparisons of labor market behavior and outcomes can be 
misleading unless care is used to explicitly deal with the heterogeneity of 
labor. Four distinctive features of human capital warrant brief discussion 
here. 
Differences in property rights between human and physical capital imply,-~-. 
that empirical studies must rely largely on rental market transactions in the 
case of human capital, i.e., wage rates, rather than on both rental and asset 
prices in the case of physical capital (Rosen, 1985). Given the durable 
lifetime nature of human capital, this constraint on available data is a 
serious limitation for testing theory, particularly when market lifetime 
equilibrium theories of investment are the basis for several influential 
frameworks for analyzing human capital (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1962, 1974). 
Long-term contracts between firms and workers, or between landlords and 
laborers, may add additional dynamic incentive problems to the labor market 
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when information regarding the effort and productivity of labor is notably 
How do these convenient micro equilibriumimperfect and costly to monitor. 
investment approaches of the human capital tradition mislead researchers in a 
world where disequilibrium rents are the rule and not the exception? 
Preferences of workers are likely to intrude on human capital mode.ls of 
individual behavior, while they are conveniently set aside by economists in 
their analyses of the production of market goods and services. An individual's 
decision on how much time to work in the labor market is dependent on his or 
her preferences for nonmarket time or leisure versus preferences for the goods 
that can be purchased with market income. Consequently, preferences may 
influence human capital investment decisions, unless human capital is assumed 
to be specifically neutral in its productive effect on market and nonmarket 
activities, including the formation of additional human capital (Ben-Porath, 
1967; Michael, 1982). 
Commodities that are produced for consumption within the household and are 
not readily traded across households will be produced in response to variations 
in consumer preferences of household members (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985). To 
avoid these complications, it is common to assume that farm-households produce 
for the marketplace as well as for their own consumption, and view the labor of 
family members as equivalent to labor hired from or supplied to the market; 
this homogeneity of output and labor input permits production and consumption 
decisions within the household to be sequentially optimized, and greatly 
simplifies empirical analysis of the behavior of farm-households (Singh, Squire 
and Strauss, 1986). Hired and family labor may not be perfect substitutes for 
each other in all tasks, because the ease of monitoring and therefore 
decentralizing work may differ for these two types of labor (Deolalikar and 
Vijverberg, 1983). While the family production-consumption model is attractive 
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for the study of farm production of food staples, it seems less appropriate 
for the study of the production of untraded goods, such as children, the 
schooling of those children, and the health of family members (Rosenzweig and 
Schultz, 1983). 
Any attempt to measure nonmarket benefits ~f schooling that accrue :within 
the domestic spheres of household production is subject to worrisome error, 
because of the "social and emotional factors involved" (Kuznets, 1954; 432). 
This is one among many reasons that led Kuznets and those who followed him to 
exclude household nonmarket production and the housewife's nonmarket 
contribution to welfare from their reckoning of national income, valued, to the 
extent possible, at market prices. However, an important feature of 
development is the tendency for the market to take over progressively more of 
the productive activities carried out initially within the household. Thus, to 
ignore nonmarket production and human capital's contribution to these forms of 
production is perhaps a more serious omission in the study of low income 
countries, and in the characterization of the process of economic development 
in general, than it is in the analysis of growth in today's industrially 
advanced countries. 
These several differences between physical and human capital, and the 
different context of household and market production are real, and are 
responsible for some of the indirect estimation methods used in this field that 
rely on difficult to test assumptions of functional form and other 
identification restrictions. In situations where many economic and demographic 
choices of the household are viewed as jointly and simultaneously determined 
over a lifetime, including possibly the human capital investments of both the 
parents and children, it is difficult to specify exogenous constraints on which 
to base consistent estimates of behavioral relationships or household 
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production functions. Community programs, local prices, and regional 
characteristics derived from outside of the household decisionmaking unit are, 
therefore, increasingly used to identify household choice models (T.P.Schultz, 
1984). This estimation strategy depends critically, however, on the assumption 
that migration does not sort persons according to their preferences for these 
regional services, activities, and amenities (Tiebout, 1965; T.P. Schultz, 
This assumption concerning the independence1983; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1984). 
of migration may not always be defensible in developing countries, where local 
health and education programs may differ greatly today, particularly between 
rural and urban areas. Alternatively, the location of the public sector 
programs may also represent a calculated response to unobserved local 
environmental conditions or average population characteristics that the 
programs are themselves designed to change. Examples might be public health 
facilities and specific disease control programs that are established to serve 
communities with particularly severe health problems. Yet turning to community 
level constraints to help identify the determinants of household behavior is an 
attractive means to escape the vicious circle of simultaneity among closely 
related forms of household economic and demographic behavior. 
In sum, the problems of measurement of productivity are serious in the 
nonmarket sector. Relevant statistical comparisons across persons or 
that cannothouseholds tend to be subject to many sources of selection bias, 
always be persuasively corrected by available econometric techniques, theory, 
and data. Consequently, the evidence of education's market and nonmarket 
productive roles is sometimes fragile, and the working assumptions and 
statistical procedures that underlie this evidence need to be closely 
scrutinized and affirmed from a variety of methodological perspectives. 
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The outline of the chapter is as follows: Section II describes the 
expansion of the world's educational system both in terms of its inputs of 
public and private res·ources and its output of students, and then estimates how 
income, price, and population constraints appear to govern this process. 
Section III contrasts causal frameworks proposed to-explain-the relationship 
between education and productivity, and discusses sources of data to measure 
the relationship and discriminate among causal interp~etations. Section IV 
reviews evidence on the market returns to schooling measured for both 
entrepreneurs and employees, men and women, and migrants and nonmigrants. 
Section IV considers the evidence of schooling's effects on nonmarket 
production. Section V considers the policy issues for development that arise 
from the apparent effects of education on economic productivity and the 
mechanisms used to finance and manage the educational system. In the 
concluding section VI, questions for further research are reiterated. 
II. National Educational Systems: Interpretation of Aggregate Patterns!±/ 
A distinctive development of the last 25 years is the rapid expansion pf 
school systems in all parts of the world. Despite the unprecedented rate of 
growth in the population reaching school age, enrollment rates at these ages 
have increased in virtually every country. These developments are examined in 
this section to understand their origins and how economic and demographic 
factors may be governing this rapidly growing dimension of world investme~t. 
Inc·omes, relative factor prices, production technology, and demographic 
structure are interrelated in a production-demand framework as constraints and 
t 
conditions affecting the costs of, and demands for, educational services. Data 
for 89 countries from 1960 to 1980 are then used to test quantitatively 
hypotheses within this framework. Differences in school enrollment between 
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males and females are also analyzed. Finally, regional deviations in 
educational expenditures and achievements are calculated, based on the fitted 
model, to document departures from international patterns. 
Vorld Trends 
Figure 1 summarizes the level and increase in enrollment ratios at the 
primary, secondary and higher education level for countries grouped by income 
level, market/nonmarket economy, and oil exporter status. For summary 
comparison of overall levels of schooling, a synthetic cohort measure is 
constructed and called hereafter the 'expected years of schooling.' It is 
defined as the sum of six times the primary, six times the secondary, and five 
times the higher education enrollment ratios; where these weights, i.e., 6, 6 
and 5, correspond to the average number of single-year age groups combined in 
the denominators of these three standardized enrollment ratios. This new 
synthetic cross-age measure of expected years of exposure to the educational 
system should not be confused with a cohort measure of completed years of 
schooling, which also excludes years that are repeated or not accredited. 
Expected years of schooling increased 32 percent from 1960 to 1981 in the 
low income class of countries; 46 percent gains were achieved in the middle 
income countries who imported oil, and 50 percent gains occurred in the upper 
middle income class. The East European non-market countries increased their 
expected years of schooling by 35 percent, while the industrial market high 
income countries advanced 16 percent. Oil exporters in the middle income class 
achieved a doubling of expected schooling levels, while nearly a fourfold 
increase was reported in the high income oil exporters. 
In general, the p·ercentage gains in schooling were greater for those 
The gap in expectedcountries that started from a lower income level in 1960. 
years of schooling between the low and high income countries is therefore 
Figure 1 












0 I -~- 1960' 1981 
Low Low Middle Middle Upper High High High 
Income Income Income Income Middle Income Income Income 
Oil Market Non MarketExcluding Oil Oil Income 
China & Exporters lq,orters Exporters Economies Economies 
India 
Source: Derived from. World .Development Report 1984. . .Definitions ~nd. data rep~rted__in .Schultz, 1985. 
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closing, on average, whether expressed in relative terms or even as an absol
ute 
difference in years, which more adequately reflects the economic value of 
education. This closure in the absolute gap in education appears to be at 
least as rapid as that achieved in health, analogously summarized by life 
expectation at birth ..21' Figure 2 shows the corresponding figures for expected 
years of enrollments for males and females, summarized by cultural-regional 
areas; differences between enrollments of males and females have also decrea
sed 
markedly and warrant an explanation. 
The salient fact is that all classes of countries, and indeed every country 
for which overall comparisons can be drawn from 1960 to 1983, increased over
 
these years the expected schooling that it provided to the 'average' child, 
despite the extraordinarily rapid growth in the number of school-aged childr
en 
in many of the poorest countries.W The number of children between the ages
 of 
6 and 17 more than doubled in the less developed regions from 1950 to 1980. 
The proportion of the population in these ages increased from 24.5 percent i
n 
1950 to 29.1 percent in 1980. That the poorest countries and those that hav
e 
suffered actual declines in their real income in this period were nonetheles
s 
able to expand their schooling systems rapidly enough to accommodate an 
increasing fraction of their children is remarkable. 
However, a less sanguine picture of recent educational progress emerges 
Centralfrom expenditure data assembled in Table 1 from World Bank sources. 
governmental expenditures on education, when expressed in constant GNP price
s, 
have declined in many countries in the past decade. Resources allocated to 
education per capita by central governments appear to have declined markedly
 in 
real terms in the lowest income countries (including or excluding India and 
China) and increased by only 22 percent in the middle income oil importing 
countries. In contrast, oil exporting middle income and upper middle income
 
countries were able to more than double their per capita real public 
Figure 2 
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O!ntral. Gavenlllent Expenlitures: 1972, ·1991 
Percent of Total GoVemment Percent of Percent of Growth 
World Bank GoVennnent Expenditures as Growth in in per capita Real 
camtry Classci Expenditures Percent of GNP Real per Expenditure on 
(Number) on Education Ca:gita GNP Education 
1972 1981 1972 1981 1972-198115 1972-1981 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IIY Incane (34)0 16.4 5.9 21.0 15.4 26 -67 
Excludin:J Ori.na
am ImiaC 16.4 11.5 21.0 17.6 7 -37 
Middle Incane (38) 
Oil Exporters 15.4 16.6 17-.2 27.8 34 +133 
28 +22Oil Inp:>rters 11.0 10.0 20.7 21.8 
t]Wer Middle Incxlne (22) 10.8 14.3 15.0 20.6 32 +140 
High Incane -
oil exporter.s (5) 13.5 9.2 36.6 26.3 0 -51 
+87Iooustrial Market (18) 4.3 5.1 21.7 28.3 21 
F.ast European
Non-market (8) NR NR NR NR NR NR 
Notes: a 'lbe low i.ncnne class has an annual GNP per capita of less than us $410 in 1982 prices. 
'lhe middle incane class includes coontries with GNP per capita between $410 arrl $1650, 
while the upper middle inoome class rar¥3"es from $1650 to about $6000. · . 
b Annual Growth. Rate on per ·capita real GNP derived for 1970 to 1982 ftan Bank Tables,
am inteq,olated for the nine years corresporxling to expenditure data, 1972-1981. 
c 'lhe lack of data for Cllina or for India throughout this period makes the overall "I.ow 
Incxlte" country class comparisons of limited value. 
Sam:'e: 1984 World l:,Pve}91~n1.mt Report, World Banlc staff, oxford University Press, New York, 1984. 
Appendix, Table 2, page 220: Table 19, page 254; and Table 26, page 268. 
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expenditures for education, while the high-income industrial countries raised 
their real outlays on education by 88 percent. 
How have the poorer countries sustained increases in enrollments despite 
the evidence that central government outlays have not kept pace with population 
growth? One explanation for these divergent trends might be that local, state, 
and private expenditures on schooling expanded to replace central government 
outlays. Table 2 reports UNESCO estimates of public school expenditures at all 
governmental levels, confirming a decline in real public outlays on schools in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America after 1980. I cannot assess how the data 
underlying Tables 1 and 2 might differ beyond the inclusion in Table 2 of 
noncentral government educational expenditures. Private school expenditures 
are not well documented, but the share of private school enrollments is 
generally modest and declining in most low income countries (World Bank, 
1986a). Tuition and fees at public schools have also been eroded by inflation 
and public policy changes during the 1970s (Jimenez, 1984), though this trend 
may have reversed recently. 
Another explanation could be that unit costs of producing educational 
services declined, as might occur if the school system realized economies <ii: 
scale or incurred a decline in the price of educational inputs relative to fhe 
GNP deflator used here. Alternatively, the quality (or resource intensity) of 
schooling services may have deteriorated. 
In sum, alternative factors could be behind the decline in government 
expenditures on education in some low income countries: (1) the actual quality 
of schooling per student may have declined; (2) the unit costs of production of 
educational services of a constant quality may have declined relative to the 
general price level (GNP deflator); and (3) the underlying data may be in 




Pdl1.ic Expenlitmes on Mrati.on :Per CJrl.l.d of Sdlool :,ge, 1970-1982 
Region: Percent of PUblic Experditures on &:lucation PUblic Experrlitures per Child 6-17 Percent.age Growth 
World's (billions cf current U.S. dcll:u:-s) (Constant 1970 U,S.Dollars) in Real PUblic 
Expen:lituresPcpllation 
on D:iucationage 6-17 
in 1970 1970 1975 1980 1982 1970 1975 1980 1982 1970 to 1980 
Africa, excl\dirq 
1.89 5.05 12.1 11.7 23,7 39.5 57.3 44.8 142Arab states 8.0 
17.7 22,1 49.0 144. 187. 187. 282Arab states 3.8 1.80 8.44 
Asia, excl\dirq 
12.0 38.3 85.6 89.7 20.2 42.1 60.9 54.2 201Arab states 59.4 
I.atin America 8.5 5.54 14.3 32.8 36.5 65.3 108. 158. 147. 142 
5.3 71.8 113. 200. 232. 1350. 1570. 2170. 2280. 61Northern America 
Eu~, ircludin; 
146. 252. 224. 436. 714. 909. 703. 108Us.sR 14.7 64.5 
.5 1.98 6.99 10.4 11.4 418. 996. 1010. 931. 142Oceania 
147. 295. 529. 536. 654. 956. 1260. 1120. 93Develqied* Total 22.5 
12.6 37.4 81.9 92.0 16.2 31.3 43.7 41.2 170Develq;,irq Total 77.5 
628. 160. 220. 266. 232. 66World Total 100. 160. 332. 611. 
*airope, Oceania, Nort:h America; Japan, Israel and· south Africa. 
soorces: UNESCO statistical Yearl:>ook 1984, Table 2.12. GNP deflater for U.S. used to express am:ent dollars (1975: 1.375; 1980: 
1.950: 1982: 2.261): statistical .Abstract of the United States 1985, Table No. 715. POpllation 1qe 6 to 17 fl'm U.N. ~
Irrli.cators of Cgmtries, Fstimates arrl Projections Assessed in 1980, for 1975, 1980 am interpolated to 1982 and extrapolated to 
1970. For Arab States and Africa and Asia excludirq Arab States, UNESOO Statistical Yearl:>ook 1984, Table 1.2, tmifonnly 
interpolated fran 5 to 19 age groups to 6 to 17. 
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systems is restricted to countries for which there are data on enrollments, 
teachers, expenditures on current and capital account, estimates of GNP in 
constant prices, urbanization, total fertility rates, and the population's age 
composition. The data from this restricted sample of countries are believed to 
be more reliable than the comprehensive figures reported above, but possibly 
less representative. Before considering intercountry patterns in these data, 
it is useful to have a framework within which to account for variation in the 
provision of educational services. The framework involves three parts: an 
interpretation of the political economy translating private demands into public 
expenditures, a production technology linking educational inputs to outputs, 
and the determinants of household demand for public educational services. 
Adjustment of the Educational System to Demand and Supply 
Education is demanded both as a consumer good that yields direct utility 
and as a producer good that is expected to enhance the future productivity of 
the educated individual (T.W. Schultz, 1961). Private demand of consumer goods 
depends on consumer income, relative prices, and tastes. As a produced means 
of production, economists have reasoned that the private and social demand for 
education should be an increasing function of its private and social rates of 
return (Becker, 1964). However, the relationship across countries between the 
level of returns and the average quantity of schooling represents intersections 
of the presumably upward sloping private/public supply function of investment 
in education and the downward sloping aggregate derived demand function for 
more educated workers. Unless variables can be specified a priori that shift 
one and not the other side of this market for more educated labor, it is not 
generally possible to identify statistically the individual's investment supply 
response function from the aggregate derived demand function for educated 
labor. Most empirical analysis based on consumer demand theory or the human 
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capital framework studies the behavioral response of individuals or families to 
aggregate market-determined wage rates, prices, initial endowments, etc. The 
latter are exogenous constraints that are expected to partially explain the 
individual response. At the aggregate level, derived demands for labor of 
various types and the aggregated responses of individuals to invest in human 
capital and supply labor to the market cannot be as readily disentangled or 
statistically identified. In the course of economic development both the 
aggregate demand and supply schedules are likely to shift. It would be useful 
for our purposes if we could specify exogenous endowments to the economy, such 
as original natural resource stocks, or exogenous technological dimensions to 
the development process that ditfer over time and across countries, that affect 
the derived demands for relatively better educated labor and hence raise (or 
lower) the producer returns to education. However, there is as yet no. 
agreement on what these identifying variables might be. 
In the subsequent empirical analysis of aggregate school systems, national 
income per adult, relative prices, and other technological and demographic 
constraints are tentatively interpreted as influencing the individual and 
family's investment supply function of education, or, in other words, the 
private and public sector demand for schooling services. But the same income, 
price, and technology factors may also shift aggregate derived demands for 
educated labor and thereby vary the rate of return to education as a producer 
good.l/ The relationships estimated below to explain school expenditures and 
outputs are consequently reduced-form equations that may embody the underlying 
investment supply and aggregate demand parameters. Identifying these. 
underlying structural supply and demand parameters is not attempted here. 
Actual estimates of the social rates of return for secondary schooling for 
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enrollment ratios. The downward sloping scatter of observations suggests that 
the private/public supply of schooling is shifting to the right over time with 
development to trace out, approximately, the downward sloped (and probably also 
shifting) demand schedule. Some countries for which there are available 
repeated estimates of social returns confirm the same pattern within a country 
of falling social returns as the expansion of school systems overtakes 
expanding aggregate demands for more educated labor. But demand schedules may 
also shift more (or less) rapidly than supplies of educated labor, and this 
might explain the period of rising returns in South Korea from 1967 to 1~71. 
The extreme drop in returns in Peru from 1972 to 1980 may signal the added 
impact of a cyclical decline in demand for better educated labor. 
A second unusual feature of the educational system is that it produces its 
own main input, teachers. It thereby affects by its past production the 
current wage required to retain the services of teachers and consequently the 
unit cost of producing further education, other things being equal. This 
feedback effect of output on future unit costs suggests that choosing the best 
expansion path for education involves additional issues of intertemporal 
optimization and intergenerational equity, topics that implicitly arise in the 
educational planning literature, but which remain to be explicitly incorporated 
into many empirical analyses (Bowles, 1969; Freeman, 1971). For example, to 
expand a school system rapidly from a very limited national educational base 
involves inevitably bidding up temporarily the cost of teachers and may even 
require the costly importation of trained personnel. These high initial costs 
of expansion tend to decline as the pool of domestically trained secondary 
school graduates increases and these new graduates compete for available 
teacher posts. This decline in the relative price of teachers then encourages, 
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y 
along with rising incomes, more private demand for 
-
public education as both a 
consumption and investment good. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this downtrend in 
the relative price of primary and secondary school teachers, most clearly 
evident in a number of African countries which .. have recently expanded their 
national educational systems. In middle income -countries, such as·· in Latin - · 
America, the downtrend in wages of at least primary school teachers relative to 
that of the average worker is more irregular. Some part of this decline in the 
relative price of teachers may reflect a substitution of women for men in 
teaching. 
Although there is no established framework for dealing with these dynami'.c 
and recursive features of national educational systems, the current wage of 
the current level of demand for schooling.teachers clearly depends on 
to aConsequently, the price of teachers is endogenous model determining the-­
demand for educational services. To estimate without simultaneous equation 
bias the effect of this price on current demand, instrumental variable methods 
are later adopted. 
A Model of the Educational System 
areThe technological possibilities for producing educational services 
assumed to be identical across countries. This production function for 
run to exhibit constanteducational services is also assumed in the long 
returns. This does not seem to be an unrealistic assumption for primary and 
secondary school systems. If the elasticity of substitution between labor·and 
capital is one, the production function may be expressed in standard 
Cobb-Douglas form: 
(1) 
where Xis the output of educational services, Lis the labor input, K is the 
and 1-o is thephysical capital input, and o is the share of wages in output, 
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capital share, while Z is a set of exogenous technological shifters that affect 
the unit costs of producing schooling in different environments, but are 
neutral with respect to labor and capital productivity and use. One such 
Dispersedtechnological factor might be the distribution of the population. 
populations may incur greater private and public transportation costs, in terms 
of both time and money, to provide the same effective schooling services. It 
is also frequently assumed that rapid population growth, which increases the 
school age fraction of the population, strains the capacity of the government 
to provide desired school services. 
Analyses of the private demand for public goods have generally assumed that 
citizens know about the costs of production and the benefits of government 
spending (e.g., Borcherding and Deacon, 1972). The political process is 
assumed to be more or less democratic, in the sense that 
entrepreneur-politicians seek 'election' to deliver efficiently the public 
goods and services and the associated tax burden that taken together command 
the support of a majority of voters ..§/ The essential idea is that public, as 
well as private, institutions tend to optimize their input allocation and 
production decisions as constrained by consumer incomes and perceived benefits 
of outputs, on the one hand, and technological possibilities and relative input 
prices, on the other. 
that is, producesIf the educational sector thus minimizes its unit costs, 
can beefficiently, the marginal cost or price of schooling services, Px, 
expressed as a multiplicative function of the wage paid labor in the 
educational sector, W, and the return, r, required on public capital (e.g., 
Borcherding and Deacon, 1972). 
(2) 
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World capital markets are probably more effective than international labor 
markets in equalizing factor returns. If rates of return on educational 
physical capital were equalized, the only remaining constraints that would 
influence the marginal cost of education across countries and over time are the 
real wage paid to teachers, W, and the exogenous technological conditions 
denoted by Z. Teacher salaries are most of the recurrent expenses for most 
school systems. In recent years about 95 percent of current expenses in the 
primary school systems of low income countries were teacher salaries, whereas 
in high income countries the proportion is about 75 percent (World Bank, 1983; 
p. 99). Current expenditures in a school system divided by the number of 
teachers is the rough measure used here of labor costs for the educational 
system and is the principal factor determining the relative price of 
educational services in a country. The price equation can be rewritten as the 
following, if the rental rate on capital does not vary: 
(3) 
where Po is a constant, P1 - -1, and u1 is a multiplicative error in the 
production technology affecting unit costs. Because labor's share of 
educational expenditures, a, can be observed, the effect of price variation can 
be estimated from data on teacher wages (Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982). For 
simplicity, educational services are assumed to flow equally to all citizens 
who have equal numbers of eligible children to benefit. 
Finally, the quantity of schooling demanded by the median voter, q, is 
assumed to be log-linear in the tax, t (or price), in the taxpayers' income, r Y, 
and possibly in technological factors, Z, 
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(4) 
where u2 is a multiplicative error in the demand relationship. 
Expenditures per school aged child (E/P) are then obtained by multiplying 
quantity demanded by price, where the general tax rate is equal to the marginal 
price of school services: 
(5) 
in for the price of educationalSubstituting from the production technology (3) 
services, logarithms are taken of (5) and the partial effects of income per 
adult, relative prices (teacher wage), and technological shifters on public 
educational expenditures per child are expressed as a combination of underlying 
household demand and production technology parameters: 
(6) 
where (~ + l)(P0 ) + ln D, 
0 
b2 a(~+ 1) 
b3 P(~ + 1) + € 
The errors from the production technology and household demand relationships 
are combined in v, and are assumed independent of Y and Z. Knowledge of the 
labor share of inputs, a, permits the identification of the price elasticity, 
~- The net effect of incomes, o, and the Z factors--cohort size and 
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urbanization--on educational inputs and outputs can also be inferred from:. 
estimates of the reduced form equation (6). Cohort size is closely associated 
with lagged fertility and family size, and these demographic outcomes are 
inversely correlated with investments in child schooling at the family level. 
To distinguish between these factors, the total fertility rate is also included 
in the vector of control variables denoted by Z (T.P. Schultz, 1985). 
An Empirical Decomposition of Educational Expenditures 
The composition of educational expenditures may also vary with price, 
income and demographic factors, in addition to the overall level of educational 
expenditures. To evaluate these compositional effects, it is convenient to 
divide school expenditures per school-age child into a multiplicative function 
of four observable components: 
E S T C E (7)= (-)(-)(-)(-)
p P S T C 
The first term on the right-hand side is the ratio of students enrolled to the 
number of children of school age, the enrollment ratio, which can be computed 
in most countries for boys and girls separately. The second term is the 
.teacher to student ratio, that is treated as one possible indicator of the 
human capital 'quality' of schooling (Pryor, 1968; Bowles, 1969; Fuller, 1986), 
which may be contrasted with the 'quantity' response in terms of enrollments. 
The third term is the current expenditures per teacher. The fourth and final 
term is the ratio of total expenditures to current expenditures, or an index of 
the physical capital intensity of the educational system. Logarithms of the 
four component ratios in question (7) are regressed on the same income, price, 
technology, and population composition variables used to explain expenditures 
per child. The sum of the log-linear regression coefficients for each 
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to thatconditioning variable in these four component regressions is equal 
variable's coefficient in the overall expenditure per child function. In this 
way, the effect of income, price, and other factors on overall educational 
expenditures estimated from equation (6) may be decomposed into the additive 
effects of each conditioning variable operating on quantity, quality, capital 
intensity, and teacher salaries.V 
Educational expenditures are deflated to constant local prices using the 
GNP deflator and converted to 1970 U.S. dollars according to the prevailing 
average foreign exchange rate in 1969-71.!Q/ The 'average' teacher salary is 
the public current expenditures per primary and secondary school teachers, 
which is then deflated by national productivity or GNP per working age adult. 
This relative price of educational services is determined simultaneously with 
production costs and consumer demands for schooling. Unexplained variation in 
either production costs (u1) or consumer demands (u2) will thus be correlated 
with relative prices. Consequently, instrumental variable (IV) techniques are 
employed in estimating equation (6) under the assumption that the price 
variable is endogenous; the instrumental variables are specifically secondary 
school enrollment rates, incomes, and urbanization, all lagged ten years.11/ 
The IV estimates have the additional attraction of being consistent despite the 
systematic errors-in-variable problem that arises because the logarithmic 
and teacher wages are linearlytransformation of relative prices, incomes, 
dependent.12/ Although the auxiliary instrumental variable equations for wages 
undoubtedly simplify the structural process underlying time series of 
as expected,educational systems, the relative price of teachers today is, 
inversely associated with the supply of potential teachers trained in the 
country in previous decades.13/ 
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Income is measured as GNP in local constant prices converted, as are 
educational expenditures, to 1970 dollars, and divided by the population of 
working age, 15 to 65.W Population density is measured as the proportion of 
The relative size of the school-agedthe population living in an urban area. 
cohort is the proportion of the population age 6-11 for primary school, and the 
proportion age 12-17 for secondary school, following UNESCO conventions. 
Period fertility is measured by the total fertility rate, which is equivalent 
to the sum of age specific birth rates for women age 15 to 49. 
Data were first collected for 155 countries with populations greater than 
one million in 1983, for each five years from 1950-1980. Data on all required 
series were obtained for at least one year in 89 countries, of which 30 were in 
Africa, 19 Latin America, 21 Asia, 2 Oceania, 1 North America and 16 Europe•. 
The maximum number of country-year observations was 321 for primary schools and 
258 for secondary schools. In pooling of time series observations from a cross 
section, it is clear that all observations are not independent; neglect of 
error covariation across observations on a particular country undoubtedly 
biases reported tests of statistical significance and may bias estimates as 
well. 
There are substantial differences across regions in the size and resource 
intensity of primary and secondary school systems, which may stem as much from 
differences in relative prices as they do from the more widely recognized 
are 59 percentdifferences in incomes. For example, primary enrollment ratios 
in Africa and 95 percent in Latin America, while the teacher student ratios and 
capital intensity are similar, .024 and .030, and 1.22 and 1.15, respectively. 
Primary school teachers are paid about the same in the two regions, but because 
GNP per adult is one third as large in Africa, the relative price of teachers 
is fully twice as high in Africa as it is in Latin America. Expenditure per 
primary school aged child is $20 in Africa compared with $51 in Latin America. 
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The potential explanatory role of income and relative prices in determining 
school expenditures and achievements is suggested from even such gross regional 
comparisons. The large differences between enrollment ratios for boys and 
girls in Africa compared with Latin America may also stem from economic 
differences between regions. The next section summarizes the fit of the 
multivariate production/demand relationships across country observations and 
discusses the estimated magnitude of price and income effects, as well as the 
effects of urbanization and population growth. 
Estimates of School Expenditure Equations 
Total expenditure elasticities are reported in row 5 of Table 3, separably 
for the .primary and secondary school systems. Rows 1 through 4 in Table 3 
report the elasticity of the expenditure components designated in equation 
(12). The income elasticity of total expenditures (6) exceed unity; they are 
1.35 and 1.47 at the primary and secondary school level, respectively (row 5, 
first column). The share of income expended on each level of schooling thus 
tends to increase with real GNP per adult. The elasticity of total educational 
.16 and .24 atexpenditures with respect to the relative price of teachers is 
the two school levels (second column). This implies that the elasticity of the 
quantity of school services demanded, approximately enrollment, with respect to 
the price of labor, or~ in equation (9), is equal to -.80 and -.70 at the 
primary and secondary school levels.15/ 
The components underlying these income and price effects on total public 
In the primaryexpenditures per school aged child differ by school levels. 
schools (top panel Table 3) the income elasticity is about twice as large for 
enrollments as for teacher-student ratios: .31 for quantity and .17 for quality 
(rows 1 and 2). The physical capital intensity index is not well explained by 
any of the economic or demographic variables (row 4), and may contain largely 
transitory variations in capital appropriations or measurement error. Teacher 
Table 3 
Fst.imtal El.i¢icity of Sdlool system Em:ollllE.nts aid Iqut:s, 
with Respect to <lmxJes in Explanatory Variables 
level of School System 
Pr.ilnarv School Ievel: 
1. Enroll.nett Ratio (Quantity:S/P) 
2. Teacher-Student Ratio (Quality:T/S) 
3. Teacher Salaries (C/T) 
4. capital Intensity (E/C) 
5. Total Expenditures per 
School Aged Child 
(6-11) (E/P) 
Seooroaty School level: 
1. Enrollment Ratio (Quantity:S/P) 
2. Teacher-student Ratio (Quality:T/S) 
3. Teacher Salaries (C/T) 
4. capital Intensity (E/C) 
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salaries increase 87 percent as fast as do incomes per adult (row 3), 
contributing to the large elasticity of the income-expenditure relationship 
(row 5). Conversely, the relative salary position of primary school teachers 
declines by about 13 percent with a doubling of average income in a country, a 
pattern noted over time in figure 4. 
At the secondary school level (bottom panel Table 3), the income elasticity 
is four times larger for quantity (.43) than for quality (.11). The price 
elasticity is larger in absolute value for secondary schools than for primary, 
-.97 versus -.70. A decline in the price of school teachers relative to 
national productivity is associated with a substantial increase in enrollment 
but with only a modest increase in the ratio of primary school teachers to 
students and a puzzling decrease in secondary school teacher-student ratios. 
Urbanization exhibits a relatively weak, but consistent, relationship with 
public expenditures on schooling. A country which has ten percent more of its 
population in urban areas, with 50 versus 40 percent urban, tends to expend 
five percent less on schooling per child, at both the primary and secondary 
school levels. These data do not indicate precisely how urban school systems 
reduce the public costs of education. Consolidation of schools into more 
efficient sized units to exploit specialized teaching functions in more densely 
populated areas is often cited as an important source of economies of scale in 
public schools.16/ Higher population densities could also reduce the private 
opportunity cost or travel time for students. But the lack of large effects of 
urbanization reducing teacher-student ratios in secondary schools, or 
increasing enrollments, suggests that economies of scale or reductions in 
private student time costs may not lie behind this pattern in school 
expenditures. 
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The relative size of the school aged cohort, which is highly correlated 
with recent levels of population growth, is significantly associated with lower 
expenditures per student on primary and secondary schools. An increase in the 
proportion of the population of primary school age by ten percent, from .153 to 
.168, is associated with an eleven percent decline in primary school 
expenditures per child. In other words, primary school expenditures do not 
increase in response to an increase in the size of the school aged cohort. 
There are offsetting tendencies for primary school enrollment rates to increase 
for the larger cohorts, whereas teacher-student ratios fall. Teacher salaries, 
in addition, are substantially lower (ten percent) for the larger school aged 
cohort, and this appears to be the main factor explaining the lower 
expenditures per child. 
A ten percent larger cohort is associated with an even larger decline in 
expenditure per secondary school aged child, of about 17 percent. Secondary 
enrollments are little affected, but teacher salaries and teacher-student 
ratios are notably lower. Thus, larger birth cohorts do not seem to receive 
fewer years of schooling, as attested to by the pattern of enrollment ratios, 
but they do appear to receive schooling of lower human and perhaps physical 
capital intensity. 
This pattern of adjustment in the factor intensity in schools is a 
plausible economic response to the relative scarcity of both human and physical 
capital in many poor countries recently experiencing rapid population growth. 
Much thought has been given to how health care delivery systems might be 
encouraged to use less human- and physical-capital intensive technologies in 
low income countries, rather than borrow directly the highly capital intensive 
(hospital based) procedures used in the industrially advanced high income 
countries. The tendency for low income countries to substitute away from 
human- and physical-capital intensive educational production technologies 
-27-
appears, therefore, to be a reasonable innovation on economic grounds to 
different relative factor scarcities (e.g., Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978; Hayami 
and Ruttan, 1971).17/ 
Fertility, as anticipated, is inversely associated with school expenditures 
per child, and this partial correlation (not reported) stems primarily from the 
inverse association between enrollment-and .fertility, particularly at the 
Such a pattern could be expected ifsecondary level (T.P. Schultz, 1985). 
parents substitute more schooling resources per child for not having as many 
children. But the estimated relationship between fertility and school 
enrollments or expenditures is not statistically different from zero at the 
five percent level, except for primary enrollments of girls. The deletion of 
fertility from equation (6) leads to slightly larger (more negative) estimates 
of the effect of cohort size on schooling inputs, but the changes are 
relatively small (less than 10 percent). 
Sex Differences in School EnrollDent Rates 
Differences in the school enrollment rates of boys and girls may have much 
to do with the level of child mortality and fertility, the rate at which women 
migrate from rural to urban areas, leave family and domestic productive 
activities for employments in the market labor force, and in particular, for 
their increased participation in the nonagricultural sector, as discussed below 
in section V. The future economic status of women relative to men appears to 
depend heavily on their enrollment in school and their ability to benefit 
directly from the increased productive opportunities created by modern economic 
growth. 
First, the estimates summarized in Table 4 imply that the income elasticity 
is larger for female enrollment rates than for male enrollment rates: the 
point estimates for female and male enrollment rates are .43 and .24 at the 
Table 4 
Elasticity of Enrollment Ratios of Females and Males 
with Respect to Changes in Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory Variables 
















Relative Size of 
Price of School-Aged 
Teachers Population 
-.76** .98**· 











*statistically signifir.antly different from zero at 5 percent level. 
**statistically significantly different from zero at l percent level. 
Source: T. P. Schultz (1985, Tables 7 and 8). 
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.30 at the secondary level. These differences inprimary level, and .65 and 
income elasticity are statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Second, the price enrollment elasticities are greater in absolute value for 
female than for male enrollments: -.76 and -.63 for primary, and -1.07 and 
-.91 for secondary. A fifty percent increase in incomes per adult from the 
sample mean of $721 (1970 U.S.) would raise primary enrollment rates for girls 
from 69 to 83 percent, while the rate for boys would increase from 88 to 97 
percent. The girls would improve their school achievement relative to boys 
from .78 to .85. The 'gender gap' in secondary schools would also in this 
scenario close by a fourth, with girls increasing their enrollment rates from 
17 to 22 percent, while the rate for boys would increase from 26 to 30 percent. 
Reducing the relative price of schooling has a further effect of improving 
female enrollments relative to males. According to these cross sectional 
estimates of income and price elasticities, economic development with its 
effects on adult incomes and relative wages of teachers is associated with an 
equalizing of schooling opportunities between boys and girls; these tendencies 
also evident in the restricted sample of less developed countries. Hereare 
may be a potent dimension of the development process that unleashes demands for 
the schooling of girls and young women that in turn play a pivotal role in 
governing the timing and pace of the demographic transition. 
Religion is often cited as a traditional cultural force that influences the 
status of women and their educational opportunities relative to men. Muslim 
culture, in particular, is often singled out for its distinctive attitudes 
toward women's status, education, employment and, consequently, fertility. 
Adding to our framework percentage of the population that is Muslim and the 
percent that is Catholic, for example, does not change the above noted patterns 
(T.P. Schultz, 1985). 
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Regional Patterns in Residuals 
Variation across countries and over time in five variables--income per 
adult, teacher relative prices, urbanization, size of school cohort, and total 
fertility--account for 92 to 94 percent of the variation in expenditures per 
child at the primary and secondary •school levels. .Somewhat less of •.the 
variation is explained in enrollment ratios, 38 to 72 percent, respectively. 
Half of the wide variation in teacher-student ratios is explained by the model 
at the primary level, but only a fifth of the more limited variation in this 
qualitative indicator is explained at the secondary school level. Holding 
these five explanatory variables constant, the residuals from the model are 
averaged across countries by region and by development status and reported in 
Table 5. Since the educational input and enrollment variables are expressed in 
logarithms, the average residuals can be interpreted as the proportion by which 
the region exceeds or falls short of that predicted by the model. 
Expenditures per primary school aged child are 9 to 14 percent above 
average in East Asia and Africa, but 24 percent below average in South and West 
Asia. Enrollment rates at the primary level are also above average in Africa 
and East Asia, but 28 percent below average in South and West Asia and 16 
percent below in Latin America. Secondary school expenditures per child are 
about 16 percent above average in Africa, and some 18 percent below average in 
Latin America. Enrollment rates at the secondary level show more variation, 
with Latin America and South and West Asia again reporting rates below that 
which is expected. In contrast, Africa and East Asia again exhibit enrollment 
rates well above expectations. The teacher-student ratio is above average in 
Latin America, but below in East Asia and Africa. Teacher wages are higher in 
regions such as South and West Asia and Latin America which have invested~less 
than the predicted amount in secondary schooling in the past. 
\ 
Table 5 
Regirm1 Average Deviatiai of Prlnm:y am Seanm:y Sdxx>l 
Ewpenlitums am 0Itp1ts fmD ~ Pn!dicted 
Iatin Fast sooth am Ew:ope, 
Region: Africa America Asia West Asia Oceania
& canada 
{Primal:y Sample Size) 
{62) {e3} (~ll (24} (36) 
.135 -.0492 .0941 -.244 -.0664Total Expemitures
per Olild {log) 
Male Enrollment .151 -.164 .110 -.276 .0558 
Ratio {log) 
Female Enrollnlent .227 -.106 .202 -.663 .0601 
Ratio {log) 
Teacher-Student -.0002 -.0256 -.0599 .0633 .0234 
Ratio {log) 
~cher Relative -.0303 .155 . -.0058 .0385 -.155 ' 
Wage (log) 
(Secondary sanple Size)
(35) (18) -{16) (21} 
Total Expenditures .155 -.177 .0258 -.0383 -.0596 
per Child (lo;) 
.0671Male Enrollment .292 -.502 .170 --0742 
Ratio (log) 
Female Enrollment .356 -.355 .235 - ..{)15 .0289 
Ratio {l.og) 
Teacher-Student -.129 .227 - ...lSB ·.0707 .0295 
Ra.ti~ {leg) 
Teacher ~tive -.0123 .0753 . • Ol.D4 -0338 -.132 
wage .(].cg) 
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The primary and secondary school regressions identify similar regional 
patterns in residuals. They suggest an unexplained underinvestment in primary 
and secondary schooling in the South and West Asian region and in Latin 
America. Enrollment rates, in particular, are below the expected levels in 
these regions. The high level of teacher wages in Latin America and South: and 
West Asia may be traced in part to the failure to enroll more children at the 
secondary level in earlier years. The higher current wage paid for teache~s 
contributes to the higher price of educational services which deters these 
regions from expending more resources on their school systems. 
Deviations from the pattern predicted by the model based on income, price, 
and demographic characteristics of the population may signal a disequilibrium 
that might encourage the private sector to provide schooling. There do not 
appear to be sufficient data to test this conjecture, but private schools in 
Latin America and portions of Asia and Africa are not increasing their share of 
enrollments in response to the sluggish public sector provision of schooling 
services (World Bank, 1986a). Another hypothesis might be that stagnant 
economic conditions have reduced the rewards for education in the work force, 
and thereby depressed social and private rates of returns to education lowe.ring 
investment in schooling.18/At least in the case of Latin America, studies do 
not support the view that the underinvestment in secondary schooling is due to 
a low return. Indeed, the private returns that accrue to those in Latin 
America who manage to get a secondary education are substantial (see below 
Table 6). If the overall framework proposed in this section is tenable, then 
further study of country level educational outlays and achievements is 
warranted, both to discover why expenditures on schooling deviate from the • 
pattern estimated here and to determine if these deviations help to account for 
the rate and structure of modern economic growth occurring in these countries. 
Table 6 
Average Social am Private Rates of Retmns to Bllcaticn by Sdxx
>l Ieve1 
(Number of countries reported in parentheses below mean) 
Social Private 
Region Primacy Secoooary Higher Prinlary Secon
dary Higher 
28 33Africa 27 19 14 45 
(12) (12) (12) (9) {9) (9) 
Asia 18 14 12 34 15 
18 
(9) (11) (11) (5) (8) (8j 
Iatin America 35. 19 16 61 28 
26 
(8) (8) (8) (5) (5) (SY 
1gb 12 11High Income 13 b 10 8 (14) (15)Countriesa (6) (15) (15) (7) 
aEurcpe, USA, New Zea.lam., Israel. 
k>Not calculable in the majority of high income countries where th
e c::orrparison 
group without a primary education is small am highly mirepresen
tative at 
~er ages. · 
Source: Calculate:i by the author for most recent years when socia
l returns were 
available at all levels or all but priltlacy level for high income
 cotmtries. 
Original studies summarized by Psacharopoul.os, 1973, Table 14 aJX
i 1985, Table 
A-1. 
C \ • •• 
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Cross Sectional Findings and Time Series Forecasts 
One method for evaluating the overall framework proposed above is to 
calculate how well the educational changes in the last decade are explained by 
the actual changes in the conditioning variables that occurred in this period, 
weighted by the cross section estimates of the model.ill For this purpose only 
about half of the countries in the cross section sample report sufficient data 
for the decade of 1965 to 1975 and time series forecasts are described only for 
this subsample (T.P. Schultz, 1985). 
The estimated model simulates the changes in expenditures and enrollments 
reasonably well for the average of 65 observed primary school systems, that is, 
93 and 94 percent of the growth is explained from 1965 to 1975 in expenditures 
and enrollments, respectively. Increases in incomes per adult of about a 
quarter in this decade would have contributed by itself to an even larger 
increase in expenditures than the one-third increase actually observed. The 
relative decline in primary school teacher salaries and urbanization moderated 
slightly the prediced growth in expenditures. Enrollment rates at the primary 
level responded predominantly to the decline in relative prices (of teachers), 
but also increased with incomes, particularly for females. 
At the secondary school level the model underpredicts the increases of a 
third in expenditures and a half in enrollments that actually occurred across 
the sample of 48 countries. Again, income growth alone would have suggested a 
more rapid increase in expenditures than actually occurred, whereas the decline 
in prices, urbanization and a small increase in cohort size restrained the 
growth in secondary school expenditures per child. Enrollments at the 
secondary level respond strongly to the decline in relative price of teacher 
salaries; these price effects are larger at the secondary level than they are 
at the primary level. Demographic characteristics of the sampled population 
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did not change appreciably in this period and therefore had little effect on 
predicted school resources or enrollments. 
The main finding of this analysis of international aggregate data from 
educational systems is that public expenditures on schools have conformed to 
anticipated patterns with respect to consumer.. incomes,· -relative fac-tor -prices, 
and demographic constraints. ,At the secondary· level, and probably also. at the 
primary level, rapid population growth has -depressed levels-of expenditures per 
child of school age. ·· This has occurred by increasing class size -and lowering 
teacher salaries, but not by restricting notably enrollment. In the future, as 
the percentage of the population of school age declines markedly in Latin 
America and East Asia, an increase in teacher-student ratios may be expected, 
whereas in Africa where the share of· school-aged ehildren will continue to 
some time, average classroom size may continue to increase.increase for 
Future research may help assess whether the decline in public school 
anexpenditures per student that is associated with rapid population growth is 
or aninefficient bureaucratic distortion in the allocation of social resources 
efficient adjustment in factor proportions to local relative factor prices and 
returns to the quantity and quality of school services. Since Africa still 
confronts relatively high prices for teachers, given the described dynamics of 
expanding their school systems, the continued decline in teacher relative 
prices should help this continent increase enrollments without necessarily 
increasing outlays per student. A critical policy question is how the public 
sector can facilitate this efficient downward adjustment in the relative level 
of teacher salaries. Teachers·will tend to·lobby in their own self interest to 
postpone this adjustment and if they succeed it will slow the continuing 
expansion in enrollments. 
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III. Alternative Models of Education and Earnings, 
Data, and Policy Implications 
A positive relationship between the schooling of workers and their earnings 
is observed in household surveys and censuses in many countries (Psacharopoulos 
1985; Blaug, 1976). -This empirical regularity-was first examined in-high . 
income countries, such as the United States, and -then --described in ..many~ -other 
countries. -The conventional economic int:erpretation is to assume wages -·measure 
labor's marginal product and that persons acquire education as they do 
vocational training at a cost in terms of foregone opportunities that is repaid 
by future streams of enhanced earnings. The emphasis given to monetary returns 
to education in the market labor force does not preclude the private and social 
importance of nonmarket production returns to schooling or for that matter the 
~ure consumption benefits of schooling. The early focus on labor market 
returns reflected the availability of data and the historic reliance of 
economists on the marketplace to adjudicate issues of value as codified in 
national income accounts. 
The treatment of education as a form of capital investment embodied in the 
human agent can be traced back at least as far as Adam Smith, though it enters 
into the mainstream of economic thinking in the 1950s and 1960s in the work of 
T.W. Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964). The empirical relationship of wages and 
schooling is conceptualized as a life cycle regularity or age-wage profile, 
with the wage increasing first in the cross section with the age of the worker 
and then decreasing beyond some age, when depreciation of productive skills 
outweighs new investments in ·human capital. Mincer (1962) proposed •human -
capital investments on-the-job after the-completion of schooling as an 
explanation for the age-earnings profile. By assuming that post-schooling 
human capital investment declined regularly with the worker's accumulation of 
labor market experience, and that human capital investment eventually ceased as 
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retirement approached, Mincer (1974) was able to account for many interrelated 
aspects of U.S. earnings for males, by schooling and by post-schooling 
experience. 
These basic empirical regularities are summarized in the earnings function. 
This relationship has many interpretations, however, depending on what factors 
generate the relationship (Rosen, 1977). Assume that the real wage, w, of a 
worker is a function of the individual's years of schooling, s, and other 
productive characteristics, z, such as ability: 
(8)w = f(s,z), 
where z is assumed exogenously given to the individual, while hours of work, 
school quality and non-school investments in productive marketable skills are 
familyinitially ignored. If the private cost of schooling to the student or 
is approximated by the full-time opportunity cost of the student's time not 
spent working in the labor market, then the present value (V) of the 
individual's future earnings can be evaluated at the age of entering school: 
n -rt -rs -rn 
V(s,z) w(s,z) dt = w(s,z)(l/r)(e -e ), (9)J 
s 
is the number of years after entering school when the individualwhere n 
to benefit from education. If theretires from the labor force and ceases 
internal rate of return to additional schooling falls with increased schooling, 
and the discount rate or financial constraint, r, does not vary across 
schooling levels, then the family or individual continues to invest in 
schooling until the present value of the individual's earnings is maximized. 
The optimal level of schooling is that which equates the opportunity cost of 
attending school (i.e. not working) to the discounted value of the lifetime 
gain obtained from the increment to schooling, adjusted for the finiteness of 
the working life: 
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Ws = wr(l - e-r(n-s)), (10) 
where Ws is the partial derivative of the wage with respect to schooling. If 
retirement is viewed as infinitely distant, permitting one to neglect e-rn, an 
e~pression for the logarithmic wage equation is obtained: 
ln w - ln rV(s,z) + rs, (11) 
Interpersonal differences ins shift the wealth intercept and slope of the wage 
with respect to the discount rate, while differences in z affect the intercept. 
Thus, observations on ln wands do not generally identify the wage function 
(8) or the optimal schooling attendance rule, s - D(r,z). Observations on. 
ability, z, and the financial constraint, r, may permit one to describe 
empirically the wage and schooling functions. If capital markets are perfect, 
and r is the same for everyone, differences in z may allow one to estimate r 
from a regression of the logarithm of the wage on years of schooling. This 
estimate does not describe how schooling affects the earnings of any particular 
person, because z may still influence how much schooling is optimal for each 
individual. This interpretation of the wage equation (11) is consequently 
called a reduced-form hedonic wage equation, embodying both a school attendance 
equation conditional on rand z, and a wage function conditional on sand~ 
(Rosen, 1974, 1977). This hedonic wage function does not presume to identify 
how individuals vary their school enrollment in response to human capital 
returns, or how the derived demand for labor depends on the educational 
attainment of the worker. This hedonic interpretation of the wage function, 
however, admits more readily to the existence of market imperfections and 
unanticipated developments contributing to substantial disequlibrium.rents in 
the implicit valuation of different types of inelastically supplied skills 
(Rosen, 1977; Lucas, 1977; Heckman and Sedlachek, 1985). 
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The more common interpretation of the wage function i
s that developed by 
Mincer (1974) in which everyone is equally well off f
rom a lifetime 
perspective; long run equilibrium compensating differe
nces in costs and gains 
leave individuals indifferent among alternative level
s of investment in 
schooling. In this case, ln rV(s,z) is identical for
 all persons or at least 
unrelated to schooling. Consequently, equation (11) 
is an identified 
structural relationship. Regressions of ln wons pr
ovide estimates of r that 
can be interpreted as the average private internal ra
te of return-on the 
opportunity costs of schooling for a representative i
ndividual.W 
To accommodate a monotonically declining rate of on-t
he-job human capital 
investment by workers after finishing schooling, Minc
er, (1962, 1974) 
illustrates how a quadratic in post-schooling labor m
arket experience, x, could 
describe proportionate changes in wages, net of on-th




where the i's now refer to the variables that are obs
erved to differ across 
individuals, and ei is the residual error that is assu
med uncorrelated with all 
When xis unobserved, Mincer (1974) approximated it b
y
right-hand variables. 
age minus age of entry into the school system, minus 
years of schooling 
completed. In other words, it is assumed for males a
t least that they are 
attached full-time to the market labor force after co
mpleting their schooling. 
Hanushek and Quigley (1978) incorporate information o
n actual employment 
experience for males, assuming that on-the-job trainin
g should be curtailed 
For women the above empirical approximationduring spells of unemployment. 
that all post-schooling experience is equally relevan
t to market earnings may 
seem particularly misleading and Mincer and Polachek 
(1974) demonstrate the 
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differential effects of spells of market and nonmarket work experience on 
women's market earnings in the United States. However, the post-schooling 
experience variable originally proposed by Mincer has the attraction of being 
fixed for the individual, once schooling has been determined and is, therefore, 
not a choice variable or one that is likely to be particularly correlated with 
unobserved market-oriented abilities or preferences. Women's actual entry into 
and exit from the labor force and even unemployment are endogenous choice 
variables that must be jointly modeled with training investment, if the effect 
of labor market histories on wages are to be suitably estimated. 
Four broad overlapping problems with this human capital approach will be 
taken up in the next section. First, there are variables that may determine 
wages, such as ability, but which are omitted from the above simplified 
specification of the earnings function, and their omission may lead to biased 
estimates of the partial association between schooling and wages that is the 
basis for benefit-cost calculations or internal rate of return estimation.W 
Moreover, some variables used as explanatory variables in the earnings function 
are to some degree adult lifetime choice variables, such as labor supply or 
tenure on current job, and treating these as exogenous conditioning variables 
to explain the wage may also bias the estimated coefficient on schooling. 
Finally, even education can be viewed as endogenous to the wage determination 
process, when the focus of analysis is to estimate how parents trade off 
various human capital investments in their children and other bequests 
conditional on their children's exogenous endowments, such as sex and innate 
ability. But the simplifying convention in most studies of wage determinants 
is to treat education as parentally determined and thus exogenous to the 
child's lifetime choices as an adult that affect her or his life cycle 
productive opportunities in both market and nonmarket activities. 
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Second, the profile of post schooling on-the-job training investment cannot 
generally be observed, and alternative proxies for Mincer's post-schooling 
investment profile have been proposed. An analogous tendency may exist for 
employers to adopt a life-cycle incentive scheme that drives a wedge between 
wages and labor's short run marginal product, with the goal of reducing 
shirking by employees whose output is costly to monitor (Lazear, 1979). In 
either scheme the present value of the workers' profile of wages is equivalent 
to the present value of their marginal productivity. 
Third is the absence of suitable comparison groups. It is never possible 
to observe what particular persons would have earned, if they had obtained more 
or less schooling than they did. Comparisons are needed across schooling 
groups to estimate benefits and they therefore depend on restrictive 
assumptions, of which the most convenient is that parents choose the schooling 
of their children, according to the parents' endowments and preferences, but 
that these parent attributes do not affect their children's earnings, except to 
the extent that they influence the children's schooling (see alternative 
specifications estimated by Leibowitz, 1974). Holding constant in the wage 
function for parent economic attributes (status) is then one strategy for 
developing better schooling comparisons (Carnoy, 1967a; Bowles, 1972), but 
other strategies exist and they can yield divergent conclusions (Griliches, 
1977; Chamberlain and Griliches, 1977; Behrman and Wolfe, 1984a). Another 
approach is to specify explicitly the decision rule for schooling and then 
correct for the implicit selection bias of schooling in the estimation of the 
wage function (Willis and Rosen, 1979). In this quasi structural equation 
approach to self selection of education and the determination of earnings, the 
researcher must still specify variables that influence the education decision, 
but do not have a persisting effect on wages, conditional on schooling. This 
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identification restriction has not yet been motivated by an economic theory 
and, therefore, has some of the arbitrariness associated with the earlier 
approach that assigns the decision to prior parent attributes. The empirical 
importance of these alternative comparison methods are reviewed in Section IV. 
Fourth is a discontinuity between the conceptual framework and 
observations. Theory pertains to individuals investing in their productive,:,' 
capacity over a life cycle, but most data relate to different individuals of 
•different ages, which are then combined to describe a "synthetic".life cycle 
profile of earnings by age. The different aged individuals in the cross 
section have matriculated through different quality schools, lived through 
different historical conditions, such as depressions and spells of 
unemployment, and were born into different sized birth cohorts which may 
influence their schooling and earnings opportunities (Freeman, 1979; Welch, 
1979; Falaris and Peters, 1985; T.P. Schultz, 1985; Freeman and Bloom, 1985). 
Moreover, the standard interpretation of the coefficient on schooling in the 
wage function is that of a private rate of return in an equilibrium investment 
setting (Mincer, 1974). The applicability of the equilibrium investment theory 
to a country where modern economic growth has only established itself recently, 
and then occurred sporadically over time, may be misleading. Older cohorts 
were probably educated without the expectation of their current realized 
returns. The effects of economic growth on life-cycle returns to schooling in 
low-income countries have rarely been analyzed with appropriate longitudinal 
data, an exception being that of Malaysia by Smith (1983). Lacking the 
required panel or retrospective data in most countries, short- and medium-run 
fluctuations in the aggregate economy can perturb the apparent levels of 
educational returns as estimated from "synthetic" age cross sections, 
particularly at younger ages.W 
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All of the above problems in the human capital interpretation of the 
relationship between schooling and earnings could be viewed as "revisionist" in 
spirit. This is because they attempt to revise and reformulate the human 
capital concepts, to modify its empirical specification, to use better 
estimating techniques for the wage equation, and to collect more appropriate 
data to bring the evidence closer to the core of the theory. Other critiques 
of the human capital interpretation of the education-wage regularity seek to 
find a fundamentally different way to explain how education influences labor 
market outcomes. 
The primary alternative hypothesis is that of signaling or screening 
(Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973). According to this view, education does not act to 
train or to socialize a worker to perform more productive tasks individually or 
in a team. Rather, education filters or screens on the native ability or­
productivity of the worker, without enhancing it. Information on ability is 
signaled to the employer by the worker investing his time and resources in the 
acquisition of schooling. A private gain from schooling may still be inferred 
from the schooling-wage relationship, but the social return to schooling is 
more complex. The production of information needed to assign more able workers 
to jobs where these abilities are more productive yields a social product, but 
what is not clear is whether education is an efficient mechanism to accomplish 
this matching of workers and jobs? To many observers, education would seem to 
be a time consuming and costly device to screen for the ability of workers, if 
schools do not also augment their skills. If it could be shown that an 
alternative screen worked as well as education, but had lower social costs, 
then the alternative scheme would be socially preferable to education. 
The simple fact that no society, capitalist or socialist, has pursued an 
alternative scheme to education to produce the information needed to match 
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workers to jobs casts doubt on the validity of this extreme form of the 
signaling hypothesis. But a more moderate interpretation would hypothesize 
. 
that school credentials provide an important source of information in the ~bor 
market that employers can access at low cost. Educational attainment is a 
means to "discriminate statistically" among workers in hiring; it is moreover a 
means that is accepted by some as fair (Blaug, 1985), whereas many other 
groupings of individuals that might be used to discriminate statistically are 
challenged by some as socially unfair, such as by race, sex, age, marital 
status, and ethnic group. 
Within an undistorted general equilibrium framework, both the human capital 
and the screening hypotheses provide alternative explanations for the 
schooling-wage relationship. It remains to be demonstrated whether the 
screening theory "can be made to yield interesting and testable implications .in 
the absence of direct measurement of ability" (Arrow, 1973:215). Empirical 
tests of the importance of the screening hypothesis have followed several 
directions. The first identifies situations where labor market institutions 
appear more or less likely to depend on the screening information of schooling 
in determining labor's payment. Private returns to schooling according to the 
screening hypothesis should be greater in those situations where the hiring 
mechanism could readily rely on schooling as a screen. Many studies have 
contrasted the private returns to schooling in wage employment and in self 
employment. Self employed, and in particular small farmers, are a class of 
workers producing within a reasonably well understood technology, where outputs 
and inputs are competitively sold and bought, respectively. Higher earning~ 
associated with a farmer's schooling, net of inputs, cannot be readily 
explained by screening but can by human capital. Analogous reasoning suggests 
that public sector employment might be most prone to emphasize educational 
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credentials as a screen, but this does not emerge clearly from empirical 
studies (Psacharopoulos, 1985; Van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1986b). 
Educational differentials in wages might be exaggerated at the time of hiring 
by screening, but should diminish with job tenure as the employer learns more 
about the worker's productivity. But they do not appear to (Layard and 
Psacharopoulos, 1974). Since none of these testable implications of the 
screening hypothesis receive strong support from data in high or low income 
countries, are we to conclude that screening by education does not occur? Self 
selection of occupation could explain the first results, if the ablest educated 
workers choose to be self employed and the ablest uneducated seek to be wage 
earners, widening the observed education-wage differentials for self employed 
compared with wage earners. Analogously, job tenure is not exogenous, and 
employers may selectively fire the educated worker who does not produce at the 
anticipated level, leading to the persistence in wage differentials by 
educational level with increasing job tenure. Self employment may be more 
risky than wage employment and a risk premium to the self employed complicates 
comparisons of earnings across these types of jobs. The more educated worker 
may be less prone to quit or turn over at his or her initiative, ~nd this 
tendency may explain part of the wage premium received by the more educated 
(Weiss, 1984; Kiefer, 1985; Donohue, 1986). The intrinsic difficulty in 
discriminating between the human capital and screening interpretation leaves in 
doubt whether for most practical purposes it matters which mixture of these 
stories best describe reality. 
A third approach views education as an instrument for job competition in a 
distorted labor market (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1977). If wages are not 
flexible downward and an excess supply of educated labor exists for the 
available jobs requiring a specified level of education, the employer is 
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assumed in this model to clear the market by raising the educational standards 
for the job until the supply of educationally qualified job applicants no 
-longer exceeds the respective demand for labor. This "job ladder" model is 
similar to the Harris-Todaro (1970) model where urban-unemployment, a form of 
queuing, clears the labor market that is also distorted by an excessive and 
rigid wage in urban employment. The rationing of jobs by education, if wages 
are sticky downward, provides a second-best economic outcome in the ·presence of 
labor market distortions, and leads to the employment of over qualified 
workers. An inefficient match of workers and jobs occurs in this formulation. 
A similar "bumping" model is proposed by Fields (1974a) in a partial 
equilibrium context. I have not found empirical tests of this third approach 
to modeling the effects of education in a distorted labor market. 
Measurements of distortions in labor markets are rarely conclusive, even 
though many influential theories of economic development are built on specific 
sectoral distortions and distinctions in the labor market. The intrinsic 
problem with estimating the magnitude of distortions is the expectation that 
variation in unobserved productive characteristics of workers provides an 
alternative explanation for wage differences between workers in distorted and 
undistorted sectors. For example, the empirical tendency for union wages to 
exceed nonunion wages, given the worker's observed skills, suggests an economic 
distortion may be created by unions (Lewis, 1963, 1985). But if unionized 
sectors attract more productive workers or the union as an institution raises 
the productivity of its membership, no loss in efficiency may result (Freeman 
and Medoff, 1984). A challenge to labor economics is to document situations 
where there appear to be wage differences between otherwise similarly endowed 
and situated groups of workers. If explanations for these regularities, or 
group wage differences, cannot be confirmed, the empirical weight of the 
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evidence may grow and a consensus for policy might follow, as in the case of 
the effect of minimum wage policies on employment opportunities for the least 
experienced and skilled workers in high income countries (Welch, 1978). One 
conclusion of this survey is that studies that ignore the human capital 
heterogeneity of labor in low income countries may be seriously misleading. 
The large wage differentials observed by worker education (as well as by sex 
and often region) realistically preclude interpretation of aggregate sectoral 
wage variation as compelling evidence of distortions, particularly in low 
income countries. Refining the evidence of labor market distortions within and 
across low income countries at the disaggregate level of workers and firms is 
an important research frontier in development economics. The theories of wage 
variation that were recapitulated in this section may provide a basis for these 
microeconomic studies of wage structures. The next section reviews in more 
detail the empirical problems of inferring the returns to education from 
microeconometric studies. 
IV. Rates of Return to Schooling in Market Activities 
Estimates of the rates of return to education can be calculated on two 
bases. The private rate of return is the internal rate of return that 
equalizes the present discounted private opportunity and direct cost of 
schooling with the discounted value of the private after-tax gains. The social 
rate of return adds to private costs the public and private subsidies that the 
individual stuqent and family do not bear, and augments the private gains to 
include taxes and any net positive social externalities that are not captured 
by the private individual and family. In reality, it is rare for studies to 
assign monetary values to social externalities of education, or to private 
nonmarket benefits of schooling. Relatively few private return calculations 
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even deduct for the marginal income taxes paid the state by the more educated 
worker. This latter task is not conceptually difficult, but would not make any 
difference if taxes were proportional to wages. Consequently, the distinction 
between private and social returns is in practice the inclusion of the social 
cost of public expenditures per pupil in addition to private family costs of 
schooling. Social returns are, therefore, lower than private returns to the 
extent that the educational system is publicly subsidized. 
Private returns provide one incentive for individuals and families to 
invest in education, while the consumption value of schooling provides the 
second (unobserved) motivation for private decisions regarding education. For 
social resources to be efficiently allocated, they should be invested in each 
level and type of education to the point where the marginal social returns are 
driven down to levels that social and private investments receive in other 
sectors of the economy. 
Private individuals are attracted to higher private return activities, but 
the efficiency rationale for public subsidies in education is no different than 
elsewhere, as Becker observed many years ago (1964). Neglecting distributional 
issues, public subsidies for education should vary in proportion to the 
positive social externalities generated by the specific type and level of 
education. It is commonly believed that externalities from education are more 
substantial at the basic primary level, and eventually peter out at the higher 
technical specialized levels of university training, where persons capture most 
of the social benefits (minus taxes) from their education (Weisbrod, 1964). 
Research activities that are often combined with higher education may, however, 
be responsible for substantial social externalities, to the -extent that their 
services are nonappropriable by the research university and hence freely 
available to firms and households. 
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Estimates of rates of return to education for 46 market eco
nomies are 
summarized in Table 6, by region and school level (data draw
n from 
As noted
Psacharopoulos (1973, 1985) based on the most recent year r
eported.) 
earlier, social returns decrease at more advanced levels of
 development across 
countries and they decrease, as a rule, at-higher levels of schoolin
g within 
countries. Social returns tend to be about twice as large 
in Africa and Latin 
America (15-30 percent) as they are in high income countrie
s (8-13 percent). 
Moreover, private returns are often twice social returns in
 low income regions. 
The exception is Asia, where social returns in secondary an
d higher education 
for the same countries (not reported) are only moderately h
igher than private 
returns, because public subsidies at these levels are a mod
erate share of 
Africa, and to a lesser degree Latin America, has providedprivate costs. 
large public subsidies for secondary and higher education. 
These relative 
differences in rates of return are generally replicated by 
estimates of 
Mincerian earnings or wage functions based on household sur
vey data, as 
The average proportionate shiftsillustrated by equation (5) in section III. 
of these earnings functions with respect to years of school
ing are smaller, 
however, ranging from 13-20 percent for Latin America and A
frica to 6-9 percent 
for high income countries (e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1985: Table
 3). 
Within a country the pattern of diminishing social marginal
 efficiency of 
human capital investments gives support to the view that pu
blic subsidies 
should focus first on the expansion of primary and then sec
ondary school 
systems. The overall picture suggests that returns are hig
hest in Africa where 
The high returns in Latinlarge educational investments began only recently. 
America may be due to the sluggish expansion of public scho
ols (Section II), 
whereas East Asia and high income countries have achieved a
 level of human 
capital investments such that social returns to schooling a
re roughly on a par 
with private returns after taxes from physical capital. 
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There are, however, issues surrounding the empirical measurement of the 
returns to schooling outlined in section III, that need to be discussed 
further. The first class of problems involve estimation bias introduced by 
inadequate specification of student ability, parent background, and school 
quality. Ideally, these could be corrected by agreement on specification and 
availability of better data. Short of that ultimate goal, most studies must 
build on imperfect specifications and data. My own judgments are offered below 
as to what are the more serious problems and the direction of bias to be 
anticipated. The second class of problems arise because only a portion of the 
population reports the information sought on wages and related productive 
characteristics. If selection into the sample is related to the 
schooling-wage relationship, a bias may be expected. Selection problems are 
likely to be more important when the criteria for inclusion in the sample 
involves the choice of occupation, labor force participation, or migration, all 
of which can be plausibly linked to the educational qualifications of the 
worker. In these cases, the sample selection problem is essentially one of 
estimating by simultaneous equations methods some form of labor market behavior 
and the wage equation. There is no consensus, however, on how to choose the 
identifying restrictions needed to estimate thus the returns to education while 
correcting for this source of sample selection. 
Student Ability, Parent Background, and School Quality 
The foremost source of bias embodied in estimated education-wage 
relationships occurs because of the role of student ability and parental status 
in a more completely specified model of the wage determination process. As 
illustrated earlier, it is likely that more able students obtain more 
schooling, and wage payments for native ability are then being incorrectly 
attributed to schooling. Even when ability is observed before schooling 
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occurs, a rich variety of alternative methods have been proposed to disentangle 
education's independent effect on wages. This large literature cannot be 
adequately summarized here (e.g. Griliches and Mason, 1972; Hause, 1972; Welch, 
1975; Taubman, 1976; Behrman et al., 1980; Willis, 1987). If ability is simply 
omitted from the wage function, estimates of the rate of return to schooling 
may be upward biased, but in most cases by no more than 5 to 15 percent. 
Indeed, when ability and schooling are symmetrically treated as variables which 
are measured with error and potentially affected by common unobservables, 
Griliches (1977) illustrates with U.S. panel data how the "true" effect of 
schooling is actually underestimated by omitting ability and covariant 
unobservables from the analysis. Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985) examine 
data from Tanzania and Kenya to assess how cognitive achievement is influenced 
by schooling and native ability, and how all three factors affect later 
earnings in the labor force. Not only can~~ ability be held constant, it 
is also possible to evaluate whether education's effect on wages operates 
through test scores or by other means such as credentialism or screening. They 
conclude from their data that "literate and numerate workers are more 
productive, and education is valuable to workers because it can give them 
skills that increase their productivity" (p. 1029). Their analysis of 
contemporary East Africa "provides strong support for the human capital 
interpretation of the educational structure of wages" (p. 1029). 
Another important and often omitted variable is parent background or social 
status. If wealthy and powerful parents secure for their offspring both 
education and a well-paying job, the correlation between their children's 
oreducation and wages may overstate the "true" effect of education on wages 
labor productivity. Carnoy (1967a) examines this hypothesis with 
intergenerational data from Mexico and others have replicated this approach 
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elsewhere, conditioning wages on various characteristics of the parents as well 
as on the worker's education, age, etc. Most studies have found, as did 
Carnoy, that father's occupation is strongly related to the child's wages, but 
contrary to expectations, that much of this "effect" of parent background is 
intermediated through the child's educational attainment. Thus, "increasing 
the average skill level of the father has only a small effect on the son's 
incomes" given the son's schooling (Carnoy, 1967a; p. 418). In other words, 
the substantial private rates of return to education that Carnoy found in 
Mexico "show little sensitivity to changes in average-occupational level" of 
the father. Heckman and Hotz (1986) found a greater sensitivity of schooling 
returns to their inclusion of both mother's and father's education in a recent 
analysis of a 1983 survey from Panama. Their results suggest that the role of 
the mother's education may exceed that of the father's, just as Leibowitz 
(1974) found in a U.S. sample from the 1950s. The estimated average private 
rate of return to schooling in Panama was reduced from 13.0 to 8.6 percent with 
the inclusion of both parent's education variables (Heckman and Hotz, 1986). 
Various interpretations are given to the explanatory role of parent 
education or background in the child's wage function. The one proposed at the 
outset is nepotism and social stratification that allow influential parents to 
place their child in a favorable job, frustrating efficient market mechanisms, 
(Bowles, 1972). Alternatively, more educated parents may provide the child 
with a more favorable learning environment at home, thereby lowering the cosF 
of learning or increasing the market productivity of attending school for aj 
given number of years (Leibowitz, 1974; Murnane, et al. 1981). The genetic , 
transmission of ability from parent, proxied by education, to child is another 
possible mechanism behind this relationship. Parents may also vary their 
market investment in their children, given the number of years that their 
~so-
children attend school, through the "quality" or resource intensity of the 
schooling they provide their children. Adopting this final interpretation of 
the source of the parent background effects on the child's future wages, social 
scientists have proceeded to specify and measure how home learning environments 
differ, and how the level and mix of resources internally allocated by the 
school system to the pupil's education varies, and, finally, what are the 
effects of these different mixes of investment inputs on the child's subsequent 
earnings in the labor force. 
Originally the addition of parent education or other indicators of parent 
socioeconomic status to the earnings function of a child was designed to purge 
the returns to education of the effects of parent wealth and influences that 
were not operating through the child's education. But Griliches (1977) and 
others have shown that inclusion of parent education or background can also 
orover-correct for this possibility and bias downward the educational returns 
merely increase the erratic performance of the earnings function. To the 
extent that more educated parents tend to invest more in the education of their 
children, it is not clear why this component of education should not be 
examined to infer returns to schooling, To understand how educational 
decisions are made intergenerationally should provide a structural foundation 
for explaining who gets educated, as well as eventually estimating how the 
observed returns to education are affected by who receives the education 
(Willis and Rosen, 1979). It may then be possible to estimate additionally how 
parent education also influences their children's earnings by providing them 
with home investments, social connections, and physical wealth. 
Unfortunately, relatively few bodies of data measure the home and school 
environment in such detail and also follow over time the child's subsequent 
wage profile in the labor market. Nonetheless, imperfect data have been used 
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widely since the 1960s to appraise the returns to the quality as well as 
quantity of schooling, culminating in the estimation of education production 
functions (Kiesling, 1971; Averch, 1974 et al.; Hanushek, 1979, 1986). Welch 
(1966) first analyzed public expenditures per pupil, length of school year, 
teacher salaries, and classroom size, among other variables, to account for 
market wage returns to expenditures on schooling across U.S. states (assuming 
people did not move). Where parallel school systems serve distinct segments of 
the population, the consequences for wage differences between these populations 
can be decomposed into those attributable to different years of schooling and 
to the different resource intensities of their segregated school systems 
(Welch, 1975; Orazem, 1983). 
Others have employed micro data on the earnings of individual workers, 
their schooling, and the characteristics of the schools they attended (e.g. 
Johnson and Stafford, 1973; Link and Ratledge, 1975; Rizzuto and Wachtel, 
1980). The analogous analytical process has been pursued in low income 
countries with proxies devised to measure the "quality" of schools and teachers 
(Birdsall, 1985). These studies address the policy choice of extending more 
schooling to more people by pushing out the extensive margin, or investing 
those resources in more intensive schooling activities, such as improving the 
training and salaries of teachers. Clearly, a tradeoff of efficiency and 
equality of opportunity may have to be faced when in practice public funds may 
either be used to expand the quantity or quality of schooling (Behrman and 
Birdsall, 1983). Even if it could be assumed that the benefits flow in either 
case to the same person, and thus there were no distributional effects, it is 
difficult to infer whether the future market productivity of a worker who is 
offered more years of existing quality schooling will be larger or smaller than 
if those same educational resources had been used to provide the worker with 
better quality schooling. 
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One empirical conclusion should be expected: when "qualitative" measures of 
schooling are added to the earnings function, the estimated private returns to 
"years of schooling" will undoubtedly decrease. This follows from the general 
underlying positive covariance between quantity and quality of schooling. 
Regions spending more on schooling will attract more students to enroll and 
stay in school longer, because for the same private opportunity cost of the 
student's time, a more concentrated and presumably more valuable investment is 
accumulated. It is also a common empirical regularity to observe a positive 
regional association between parent private home investments (that are 
generally unobserved in data used to study wages) and public school quality 
investments. Thus, unless the home environment is held constant, variables 
that measure school quality will also proxy these reinforcing background 
private investments and bias upward estimates of the wage returns to school 
quality and quantity. Regardless, the simple estimate of returns to school 
quantity should always be interpreted as capturing the effect of increased 
quantity plus the uncontrolled background association in the sample between 
school quality and levels of schooling. 
While we cannot confidently generalize about the relative returns of school 
quality and quantity on market wages, international comparative studies of 
education's effects on standardized school achievement tests do suggest several 
regularities that might guide future research to measure how the economic 
returns to schooling differ across these extensive and intensive margins. 
Generally, "the potency of a pupil's home background or social status is 
significantly less (important) than it is in the industrialized countries in 
determining pupil achievements" (Heyneman, 1984: p. 299). Conversely, "the 
variation in academic achievement attributable to factors internal to school 
classrooms, such as the quality of the teacher and physical facilities" is 
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significantly more important in explaining test performance in low income 
countries than in the more developed countries (Heyneman, 1984: 299). Although 
the reason for these differences in the roles of family background and school 
quality in determining pupil achievement is not well established, some have 
concluded that the leverage of public policy on pupil performance through 
improvements in school quality is greater in low income countries than it is in 
high income countries (Heyneman and Loxley, 1983). Unfortunately, the 
relationship between test achievement scores and subsequent wage rates is not 
always strong, raising the question whether test achievement is a satisfactory 
indicator of schooling output, particularly across countries where the derived 
demands for educated skills differ greatly. Indeed, it has been a frustrating 
finding of many of the more thorough studies of educational production 
functions in the United States and in other countries that well-accepted 
dimensions of school quality, such as teacher-student ratios, exhibit little 
systematic relationship to student performance (Averch, 1974; Simmons and 
Alexander, 1978; Hanushek, 1979, 1986). More research is required to generalize 
about how changes in the mix of school inputs and management incentives affect 
school outputs. Moreover, economic evaluation studies of schools must go 
beyond assessing the impact of schools on student test achievements and follow 
up the differential economic success of students in the labor market by 
measuring their subsequent earnings. As with estimates of the returns to years 
of schooling, estimates of the benefits from using a more efficient mix of 
inputs in the school may be biased if the sample variation in input mix is not 
randomized, and thus potentially correlated with unmeasured variables 
determining earnings or who is educated, either at the level of the individual 
or school. 
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Reallocations of inputs internal to school system
s may improve the 
efficiency of schools, but inputs other than teac
hers absorb only a small 
fraction of public school expenditures in poor co
untries. Policies that 
attempt to raise the quality of educational serv
ices, when public sector 
educational budgets are already strained, may ret
ard the growth of enrollments. 
The last to enroll or to be allowed to advance to
 the next class, when 
rationing of school places occurs, is likely to b
e a child from a relatively 
poor family. Hence, improvement in the quality o
f schooling may, ·in practice, 
be purchased at the cost of a less equitable dis
tribution of schooling 
Given the pattern of social returns by level of s
chooling
opportunities. 
(Table 6), both efficiency and equity would dicta
te expansion of basic primary 
and secondary education. When it comes to reorie
nting educational policy to 
improve school quality in low income countries, a
chieving this goal will 
probably entail a sacrifice in terms of moderatin
g growth in enrollments. Any 
gain in returns associated with increasing schoo
l quality will come at a cost 
in terms of equity or the personal distribution o
f those returns. 
Labor Supply and Unemployment 
Individuals with different levels of education m
ay choose to work different 
Rates of return to education will then differ de
pending on
numbers of hours. 
whether returns are based on comparisons of hour
ly wage rates or on an annual 
rate of earnings (T.P. Schultz, 1968). Appropri
ate methods for dealing with 
adjustments in labor supply in constructing the b
enefit stream from education 
have received little attention, but may be more 
important in low income 
countries than they are in the industrially adva
nced countries. 
The first source of such a change in labor supply
 behavior might be 
attributed to the investment resources used to a
cquire the education. This 
reduction in the more educated individual's or fa
mily's physical wealth would 
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reduce the demand for leisure and induce him or her to work longer hours 
(Lindsay, 1971). The negative sign of the physical wealth effect on labor 
~' 
supply is based on the standard assumption that the demand for leisure and,time 
in nonmarket production is a positive function of wealth. But according to 
Mincer's (1974) equilibrium investment framework, the present value of the~ 
of human and physical capital is not affected by investments in schooling.': In 
this case, the total wealth effect of schooling should be unimportant. 
The voluntary labor supply response to the increased wage rate offered to 
more educated workers can be decomposed in the Slutsky equation into an i~come 
effect and an income-compensated price (wage) effect. Again the Mincerian 
framework would lead us to expect relatively small income effects associated 
with schooling, if individuals face a common financial constraint and can 
borrow at the same interest rate. This assumption may be less realistic in 
countries with less developed loan markets for investment in human capital and 
greater inequality in family wealth. In these countries one should expect.:to 
observe a greater tendency for the more educated to work fewer hours. Thi\;: 
tendency would lead to underestimating the private return to schooling based on 
annual earnings, because the more educated receive part of their return from 
schooling in the form of increased time for nonmarket activities, including 
leisure. Conversely, this argument would lead one to expect a greater tendency 
for the more educated to work longer hours in societies where family wealth is 
more equally distributed and loan instruments for investments in human capital 
are widely available. The income compensated price (wage) effect would 
encourage the more educated to work longer hours. If this were the only effect 
of education on labor supply, annual earnings comparisons would overstate the 
private returns to schooling. 
-56-
For youth and married women, the partial association of education and hours 
of market work tends to be positive, if other sources of income, such as family 
or husband income, are held constant. If hours in the labor market increase 
with education, then the change in "annual earnings" associated with schooling 
probably overstates private returns, because the offsetting loss of nonmarket 
production and leisure is not deducted from the gains in market earnings. 
Change in "wage rates" (e.g. annual earnings divided by hours) attributable to 
education is thus a more suitable approximation of the welfare benefits from 
schooling than changes in weekly, monthly, or annual earnings, particularly for 
women.23/ The preferred dependent variable in the earnings function is, thus, 
the logarithm of the hourly wage rate, deflated of course by local prices. To 
introduce measures of labor supply among the right-hand-side explanatory 
variables in the wage function is also inappropriate, unless they are treated 
as endogenous.ill 
Unemployment can represent a productive period of search for an appropriate 
match of workers' skills and job opportunities. If unemployment is greater 
among more educated youth during a relatively short period after they complete 
their schooling, the opportunity cost of this search should be reckoned along 
with the other costs of schooling to be paid back by enhanced earnings in later 
employments (Blaug, 1973; Turnham, 1971; Berry, 1975; Gregory, 1980; Berry and 
Sabot, 1984). A decade or longer after entry into the labor market, 
unemployment is generally lower among the more educated (Ashenfelter and Harn, 
1979; Nickell, 1979). If this pattern does not reflect a current choice of the 
worker between nonmarket activities and market work, then unemployment may be 
called "involuntary." One of the private gains from increased schooling is 
presumably the enhanced access to regular work opportunities in the market 
labor force, and hence a lower incidence of such involuntary unemployment. 
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While individuals may reduce their own unemployment by investing in schoolfng, 
it has not been empirically shown that a more educated labor force experiences 
in the aggregate less unemployment. Private returns to education may, thus, 
exceed social returns from this source.W In many studies that construct 
estimates of the returns to education, the unemployed appear to be excluded and 
variation in labor supply is neglected. One explanation for the omission of 
the unemployed from the working samples from which rates of return to education 
are estimated by regression methods is simply the lack of an appropriate wage 
for the currently unemployed. Unemployment is probably also more difficult to 
measure reliably in low income than in high income countries, because of the 
greater ambiguity in classifying activity as nonmarket or market. Nonetheless, 
returns to schooling should be estimated for all persons, to avoid potential 
sources of selectivity bias. Simultaneous analysis should, therefore, evaluate 
how education affects market labor supply behavior, unemployment, and the wage 
rate of those employed. 
Occupational Choice 
Returns to education are, for a variety of reasons, sometimes calculated 
within subpopulations. If these subpopulations are defined by exogenous 
characteristics, such as race, caste or sex, interpretation is relatively 
straightforward, though differential participation in the labor force may q, 
remain a source of bias in intergroup comparisons. But when the subpopulations 
are not closed, as in the case of regions, because interregional migration is 
substantial, or in the case of occupations, because education may be an 
important qualification for entry into an occupation, a complex problem of 
selection bias may be present, and its empirical valuation may be difficult. 
In an extreme instance, Eckaus (1973b) calculated for the United States r~turns 
to education within a large number of narrow occupations, and drew the 
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conclusion that educational returns (within occupations) were lower than other 
studies would have led us to expect. With hindsight, it is obvious that what 
Eckaus had shown was that much of the returns to education accrue through the 
changes in occupation that education facilitates. University education might 
not increase substantially the productivity of a plumber, for example, and 
consequently persons with university degrees who remained plumbers would be a 
highly unrepresentative sample of university graduates. Both the technology of 
plumbing and the self selection of persons into that occupation could 
contribute to the observed unrepresentative returns within this single 
occupation. 
The same criticism is relevant to the careful studies by Wolpin (1977) and 
Riley (1979), that sought to determine whether the wage-education relationship 
would differ across subsamples of occupations, for which the informational 
screening role of schooling might be more or less important. Their evidence in 
support or against the screening hypothesis is ambiguous, therefore, because of 
the possible self-selection of different types of persons into different 
occupations. The problem is posed and solved under specific assumptions by Hay 
(1984), where he models the decision of U.S. physicians of their 
specialization, for example surgery, and the later earnings they receive within 
such a medical specialty. A selection correction term (see Heckman, 1979) is 
introduced for all of the occupational choices in all of the 
occupation-specific earnings equations. Hay's method then permits one to 
estimate the returns to each specialized educational path for a representative 
individual, rather than the biased-by-selection returns for those who actually 
opted for each specialization. Vijverberg (1986) has also developed a method 
for analyzing jointly the occupational choice and wage equation, conditional on 
being a wage earner. Much further empirical study of occupational choice and 
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earnings will be needed before it can be confidently concluded that returns to 
education are distinct in different occupations, or that these differences in 
returns are those prescribed by any form of the screening hypothesis. 
It is still tempting to decompose the effects of such exogenous traits as 
education, race or gender on earnings, and appraise what portion of the -effe~t 
occurs because of occupational sorting and what portion occurs within 
occupations (Polachek, 1979). Since the stochastic processes determining 
occupation and earnings are undoubtedly affected jointly by unobserved factors, 
this form of decomposition of a simultaneous equation system is feasible only 
when identifying restrictions are known~ priori, that is, a factor is known 
that influences occupation but not earnings, which can therefore be used to 
explain occupational sorting but can be justifiably omitted from the structural 
earnings equation. Studies nonetheless assume, without a clear justification, 
that occupational choice and earnings are block recursive and hence 
stochastically independent (Birdsall and Sabot, forthcoming). How well these 
single-equation estimation methods approximate reality is not yet known. 
Possibly the most important occupational distinction is between wage and 
salary earners, on the one hand, and self-employed workers, on th~ other hand. 
Most research on the returns to schooling focuses on the former class of 
employees, because labor earnings are more directly observed for them, without 
first deducting inputs from gross income.W When wage earners are a large 
fraction of the labor force, as in high income countries, omitting the self 
employed has become a standard, if indefensible, practice in empirical studies. 
When employees are a small but growing fraction of the labor force, there is 
reason to suspect that the synthetic age-wage profile across education groups 
of employees may not be a satisfactory basis for ~stimating lifetime returns to 
schooling in the overall economy.W Yet there are relatively few studies that 
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analyze how selection into the employee subsample could bias estimated returns 
to education (e.g. Anderson, 1982; Griffin, 1985). 
If one ignores the probable covariance between the choice of whether to be 
self employed worker and the worker's potential earnings, ita wage earner or a 
is possible to estimate without selection'<:orr-ection.the-wage functions for 
self employed and wage earners separately, and simply compare the coefficients 
the worker's years of schooling within.the two strata. The proportionateon 
upward shifts in wage rates or earnings with schooling are of a similar 
magnitude within these strata in Thailand (C. Chiswick, 1979), Colombia (Fields 
and Schultz, 1982), and Israel (Ben-Porath, 1986). The greater role of 
transitory income variation in the earnings of self employed has been 
frequently emphasized in the economics literature, but its relevance to the 
returns realized from education is unclear. There are, nonetheless, two 
salient weaknesses with such comparisons. First, they assume that the self 
employed are able and willing to report their labor earnings, net of the value 
rental value of owned land and businessof purchased and owned inputs (e.g. 
the US that farmerscapital). In fact we know from developed countries such as 
and unincorporated business persons report incomes to surveys and tax 
much less than the income imputed to them by trustworthyauthorities that are 
national accounts. How this understatement of self-employed income would bias 
comparisons by education is unclear. To reduce this potential source of 
reporting bias, Teilhet and Waldorf (1983) followed a small sample of 
self-employed in the informal sector of Bangkok to derive estimates of their 
net return to labor. The returns to schooling appeared to be no less for these 
self employed than for wage earners, though obtaining more education 
predisposed men in their sample to obtain a job for wages. 
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Second, the fraction of the labor force that is self employed tends to 
increase across age groups in the cross section. It would appear then that· the 
life cycle process of accumulating skills, experience, contacts, and physic.al 
·capital increases the likelihood that the individual .chooses to become sel~'_: 
employed (Fields and Schultz, 1982; Ben-Porath, 1986) .. In .approaching 
retirement, self employment may also afford a worker more opportunity than does 
t. 
wage employment to adjust labor supply downward and is thus more attractiveYlas 
a means to smooth the labor supply path at older ages (Fuchs, 1980). However, 
:
the tendency for the share of self employed workers in the labor force to 
decline with development has been long noted (Kuznets, 1966) and it could also 
explain the below average fraction of young workers in self employment and the 
rising fraction before retirement. There is little empirical evidence to 
disentangle the life cycle and the development process as they both influence 
. 0 
who chooses wage versus self employment and how this choice interacts with· 
returns on education. The null hypothesis remains to be rejected, namely that 
education increases the productive possibilities of workers in both wage and 
self employments. 
A study by Behrman and Wolfe (1984b) of Nicaragua in 1977 presents 
:-: 
estimates of earnings functions for men and women corrected for two aspectskof 
sample selection: participation in the labor market, and reporting of labor' 
earnings. This second restriction of the sample may exclude many self-employed 
workers, whose gross income includes undetermined amounts of returns to capital 
and land and unpaid family workers. How to treat missing variables in '.} 
microeconometrics is a largely unresolved problem;- to treat missing date as-' 
-~~~ 
a 
potential source of selection bias is appealing in its generality. However, 
this corrective strategy can be effective only to the extent that the strue'ture 
of the selection decision rule is well understood. Observed variables must·be 
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singled out that reasonably enter that decision rule but do not belong direc
tly 
in the earnings equation. In the Behrman and Wolfe study of Nicaragua, the 
self-employed may find it particularly hard to reckon net earnings exclusive
 of 
the value of intermediate inputs and the rental value of land and owned 
productive assets. In their sample·, ·,·only-68 percent--of- Nicaraguan .mal-e mem
bers 
of the rural labor force report earnings, while 91 percent-of the male labor
 
force in the capital-city of Managua report earnings .. Reporting earnings may
 
thus be a proxy for the individual's occupation or sector of employment. Th
e 
variables that Behrman and Wolfe specify to identify who reports earnings ar
e 
the participant's "other income" and "own-farm other income" and the female 
As anticipated,respondent's "participation in the formal or informal sector." 
farmers and participants in the informal self-employed sector report their 
earnings less often than do those working in the formal sector, particularly
 
Selection correction procedures that introduce occupationalthose in Managua. 
effects into the earnings function may introduce their own bias, as discusse
d 
above, and these might be more serious than ignoring the original selection 
This would seem a danger when theproblem associated with non response. 
variables identifying the selection correction are themselves endogenous and
 
correlated with the earnings outcome, as would appear to be true here (i.e. 
owned land or informal sector attachment). But the perennial problem of 
missing data and nonresponse bias is important and must continue to be studi
ed 
from many perspectives in the hopes that eventually we will learn how to liv
e 
with this limitation of microeconomic household survey data. 
Anderson (1982) corrected for the selection bias in her sample of 
Guatemalan husbands, where only about half of her sample reported a wage and
 
the others were mainly self-employed. The slope of her estimated market wag
e 
offer curve (identified by the exclusion of wealth) with respect to schoolin
g 
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was slightly larger than the slope of the nonmarket (reservation) wage curve 
(identified by the exclusion of experience) with respect to schooling, .094 
versus .074, based on Heckman's (1979) assumption that the errors were normally 
distributed (Anderson, 1982; Table 3). Her selection correction was 
statistically significant but ·her data do not,appear -consistent ·with ·the 
normality assumption. In this case, husband'-s weeks ·Qf participation .as a wage 
laborer are positively related to his education, and negatively to his wealth. 
The Education and Productivity of Farmers 
Many studies have specifically analyzed the education of farmers as a 
factor in agricultural productivity. Griliches (1964) in the U.S., and Hayami 
and Ruttan (1970) across countries, found that the education of farmers was an 
important determinant of agricultural productivity. Sixteen studies of the 
relationship between farmer education and productivity in low income countries 
were recently surveyed by Lockheed et al. (1980) and extended in Jamison and 
Lau (1982). These studies analyzed 37 sets of farm level data that allowed 
estimation of the effect of farmer education on profits or output, controlling 
for other variables. Averaging the varied effects of education obtained in 
these studies, the productivity of farmers was on average 8.7 percent higher if 
they had completed four years of primary schooling (a threshold level) compared 
with none. More refined calculations are also developed by Jamison and Lau 
(1982) for three countries where they could further analyze the primary data. 
From their samples from Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea they estimate a 
year of schooling is on average associated with a net increment to farm product 
of 5.1, 2.8 and 2.3 percent. Social returns to rural schooling are then 
calculated for the 1970s under various working assumptions; the social returns 
are between 25-40 percent, 14-25 percent and 7-11 percent in Malaysia, Thailand 
and South Korea, respectively. 
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How education influences production has been scrutinized most closely in 
the case of farmers, where researchers can build on a long tradition of 
econometric production and management studies. The organizing hypothesis first 
advanced by Welch (1970) was that education could have three distinct effects 
on production. First, education might-enhance the productivity of measured 
inputs including that of an hour of labor. Second, education might lower·the 
cost of deciphering information about the production technology that thereby 
increases productive efficiency by changing the selected mix of outputs and 
inputs. This is a static allocative efficiency effect. Third, education might 
facilitate more rapid entrepreneurial responses to disequilibria created by 
changes in output and input prices, and by the introduction of new inputs and 
production technologies. Huffman (1974, 1976, 1977), Fane (1975), Khaldi 
(1975), Wu (1977) and Pudassini (1983) proceeded to decompose the productivity 
gains of more educated farmers into efficiency and allocative gains. Huffman 
(1974) illustrates how the decline in fertilizer prices led more educated 
farmers to use more fertilizer and thereby increase their net farm income. 
Aggregate and individual data are also used to document how more educated 
farmers are more likely to adopt new productive innovations and accelerate the 
diffusion of such innovations (Rosenzweig, 1982b; Jamison and Lau, 1982). 
A final dimension of the adaptive response of the more educated farmer is 
his supply of family labor off-farm. In other words, the occupational mobility 
that education facilitates is also linked to dual employments, on-farm and 
off-farm. In the U.S. and in low income countries, a growing share of the 
income of farm families is from non-farm activities (Huffman, 1980; Rosenzweig 
1980) and education increases these income flows as well as adding to 
agricultural production. When returns to education are larger elsewhere in the 
economy (Gisser, 1965; Moock, 1976), the more educated farmer and his family 
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are the first to leave agriculture, and when returns in agriculture boom, it is 
the more educated managers who are the first to reenter agriculture, at least 
in the US (Tolley, 1970). The measurement of returns to education from 
migration can, thus, as with occupational choice, not be readily separated from 
the returns to education within a particular segment.of an.open economy. 
::-,:-
Migration °· 
It is generally observed that the better educated are more likely to 
migrate, unconditionally and when conditioned on other motivating·factors 
(Schwartz, 1976; Greenwood, 1975; T.P. Schultz, 1982b). Several of the working 
assumptions that permit one to interpret the proportionate shift in the 
earnings function associated with a year of schooling as a private rate of 
return may be in error when migration occurs. Real wages are generally higher 
in urban than in rural areas of low income countries, Wand net migration 
therefore tends to occur from the rural to the urban sector. Individuals who 
incur their opportunity costs of education (foregone earnings as a student) in 
the low wage rural sector and then enter the high wage urban labor force stand 
to gain from education, from migration, and from a combined effect of arbitrage 
in the investment process. Given the tendency for more educated men and wo~n 
. .:1• 
to migrate in their youth shortly after finishing school, it can be misleading 
to estimate a return to schooling within the rural sector that excludes the 
gains from the increased probability of outmigration from the rural sector. 
Conversely, estimating a wage function for only the urban labor market may also 
be misleading, because it does not recognize that rural in-migrants realize 
larger returns than estimated given because their costs of attending school in 
rural areas were lower. 
The problem is illustrated empirically in Table 7 with data from the 1973 
Census of Colombia. Estimates of monthly earnings functions in the upper panel 
• 
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description of data. 
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for men and women are reported separately for the subpopulations resident in 
urban and rural areas. Estimated private returns to schooling for men who 
reside in rural areas appear to be about one half as large as for men in urban 
areas, 10 as contrasted with 18 percent. This pattern of lower returns to 
schooling in the rural sector is frequently noted and often attributed to the 
lesser quality of rural schools (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983) or to the less 
dynamic technology of traditional agriculture that creates fewer opportunities 
for the educated worker to recoup his investment (Jamison and Lau; 1982). 
Correspondingly, the slope of the earnings profile with respect to 
post-schooling experience, that is interpreted by Mincer (1962, 1974) as a 
return to on-the-job training, is substantially lower within rural than within 
urban residential strata of Colombia. These differences are equally evident 
among employees and the self-employed male workers in Colombia (Fields and 
Schultz, 1982: Table 6). Smith (1983) finds similar rural-urban differences in 
returns to post schooling experience in Malaysia based on longitudinal data. 
The explanation may be fewer opportunities to accumulate on-the-job training 
and work experience that raise the workers' subsequent earnings in traditional 
agriculture compared with those experiences available in the urban economy. 
But about half of the men born in rural areas of Colombia had migrated to 
urban areas by 1973, and half of those residing in urban areas in 1973 were 
born in rural areas. Categorizing the workers by whether they were born in a 
municipality with an urban center (i.e. a town over 35,000 in 1973) or 
otherwise in a rural area, leads to the second panel of stratified income 
equation estimates. Ignoring the relocation costs of migration, the private 
returns to a year of schooling for the rural born are now virtually identical 
to those earned by the urban born, namely 19.0 and 19.1 p~rcent, respectively. 
The slope of the income experience profile is also much more similar between 
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rural and urban birth cohorts than it was between rural and urban resident 
populations. Thus, almost half of the gains to rural schooling is obtained 
through migration to urban areas of Colombia. 
Other studies of earnings in Colombia document that rural migrants are not 
Indeed~disproportionately among the unemployed upon arrival.in.the cities. 
the immigrants overtake the earnings of the native city-born workers within 
five years of their arrival, holding constant for their education, age, and 
sex. (Ribe, 1979). Yap (1977) found a similar tendency for rural-urban 
migrants in Brazil, where they achieve income parity with city natives in less 
than a decade. These studies are parallel to the extensive evidence that 
immigrants to the U.S. progressively close the earnings gap they initially 
confront in competition with U.S. natives, and reach income parity after about 
a decade (B. Chiswick, 1978). Estimates of the private return to rural 
schooling for men are seriously biased downward in Colombia when analysis is 
onrestricted to persons remaining in the rural sector. Analyses focused 
regional or rural populations subject to large net outflows of migration may 
contain similar biases, as in Colombia. The magnitude of this bias in 
educational returns within the rural sector in developing countries warrants 
more study.29/ 
Alternatively, if many local markets are aggregated to include possible 
migratory destinations, and thereby approximate a closed population, returns to 
schooling can also be biased by the omission of regionally relevant factors 
(Birdsall and Behrman, 1984). For example, geographical variation in the cost 
of living, the quality and private cost of schooling, migration costs, and 
region-specific income reporting problems may all deserve explicit attention in 
the aggregate, but may be more easily neglected in some stratified samples. 
Because the perfect single capital and labor market underlying Mincer's (1974) 
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equilibrium model for the earnings function is not entirely realistic, 
modifications may be made in the list of conditioning variables, while the 
levels of aggregation should correspond as closely as possible with the birth 
cohort which proceeds to obtain specific amounts and qualities of schooling. 
Since the rate of rural-urban migration and its educational selectivity 
differs substantially from Latin America to South Asia and Africa, to East Asia 
and the Middle East, there is no reason for the rural-urban migration effects 
evident in Colombia to be universally replicated. Some areas of traditional 
agriculture may not have off-farm opportunities open to the educated. For the 
same reason that Eckaus (1973a) found private returns to education low within a 
sufficiently narrow US occupation, private returns to schooling among day labor 
in rural India for relatively unskilled agricultural tasks may also be low, 
unless mobility is allowed for. The private returns to schooling for the 
landless in these circumstances may reside in the ability of the more educated 
to gain access to other forms of employment and possibly exit the rural sector 
altogether. Care must be exercised in constructing comparison groups, 
therefore, to evaluate the returns to education including the full range of 
economic opportunities open to the more and less educated. Following a birth 
cohort or school-class cohort provides one way to minimize the sample selection 
bias that mobility may otherwise introduce. Stratifications of samples along 
the lines of regions, rural-urban areas, or occupations can all lead to 
selection bias in estimating returns to schooling. These sources of bias may 
be particularly serious in the study of educational returns in low income 
countries, as illustrated above with reference to Colombia. 
Kale-Female Return Comparisons 
If all men and women work the same time for wages, private market returns 
to schooling could be calculated for each sex separately and readily compared. 
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An efficient allocation of investment resources to the schooling of women and 
men would then tend to equalize these sex-specific market returns, to the 
extent that returns to schooling in nonmarket production within households were 
of a similar magnitude for women and·men. But women generally participate less 
often and when they do participate they may work fewer hours in. the, market ... 
labor force than do men (Layard and Mincer, 1985; Durand, 1975;. Standing, 
1978). Thus, the potential for a sample selection bias on this account would 
appear more obvious in the case of computing returns to women's education than 
in the case of men and add to our uncertainty.in comparing rates by sex. But 
the nature of this bias, if any exists, remains to b~ empirically documented in 
the various cultural and economic regions of the world. 
It is incorrect to assume that women gain less from schooling merely 
because they spend fewer years after school working in the market labor force. 
As shown in section V below, schooling also increases the productivity of 
women's time in nonmarket production. Demands for nonmarket production, 
however, are limited by the extent of the household market, because the final 
commodities produced in the household are largely untradeable.W The tendency 
for more educated women to allocate more of their time to market labor force 
activities can be explained by both the relatively inelastic demand for 
nonmarket output and the likelihood that education enhances specialized market 
production skills more than education increases the value of the marginal 
product of women's time in nonmarket production. The family labor supply model 
suggests that it is also appropriate to control in such comparisons for the 
wage rate of the woman's husband or other family members and the nonearned 
income of the family.31/ Because the value of other members' time and 
nonearned income is likely to reduce the woman's market labor supply and be 
positively correlated with her education, these controls specified by the 
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family labor supply framework are likely to increase the estimated positive 
partial effect of women's education on her market labor supply. Moreover, this 
empirical regularity may be strengthened further if unpaid family work that is 
conventionally counted as being in the labor force.is ex~luded from our measure 
of market labor supply. Unpaid family worker status for.women is the least 
satisfactorily measured aspect of labor supply across societies (Durand, 1975; 
C. Chiswick, 1978; Hill, 1983) and it is precisely a labor· market transaction 
within the family rather than in the labor market for which a shadow wage 
cannot be directly observed. 
Thus, given the sensitivity of women's market allocation of time to their 
educational attainment, direct estimates of market returns to schooling 
inferred from only women working for wages may well be unrepresentative of the 
potential returns received by a representative woman in the population.32/ 
Here is an important issue for public policy, that has received surprisingly 
little empirical study. 
Griffin's (1985) analysis in the Philippines is an exception. He considers 
the earnings of married women in the Bicol region in 1980 to appraise how 
robust estimates of schooling returns are to alternative methods for dealing 
with this pervasive source of sample selection bias. He estimates jointly for 
women outside the market labor force a nonmarket (reservation) wage function 
and a market wage function for wage offers to those working. The 
selection-corrected model of Heckman's is plausibly identified within the 
context of the family labor supply model. Based on the conventional log linear 
specification of the earnings function where returns to schooling are constant 
across schooling levels, the selection-corrected estimate of schooling returns 
is 18 percent, compared with the conventional estimate of 14 percent, baseid on 
only the quarter of the sample who is working in the market labor force and 
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The selection correction is highly significantreporting the requisite wage. 
But based on astatistically and certain features of earnings function change. 
single regional sample from a single country, it is not reasonable to draw any 
general conclusions regarding the magnitude or even direction of this selection 
bias on women's returns to schooling. 
Conventional earnings function estimates of the private returns to 
schooling for males and females that ignore the selected nature of the female 
samples are summarized in several papers (Woodhall, 1973; Psacharopoulos, 
1973). The average of 16 country studies recently cited by Psacharopoulos 
(1985: Table 5) suggests that the uncorrected returns to women may be somewhat 
higher than to men at the secondary level and overall, but marginally lower at 
the primary and higher educational levels. Because there is no g priori basis 
to conclude that sample selection bias would necessarily alter these estimates 
upward or downward, they must stand as the best evidence currently available. 
In that light, a modest bias may exist in underinvesting in women's schooling 
relative to men's on efficiency grounds, which is not inconsistent with the 
cross country comparisons of enrollments analyzed in section II. This is an 
The family labor supply modelarea that needs further empirical research. 
provides some guidance as to how corrections for the self-selection of women 
orinto the market labor force can be reasonably identified by family wealth 
husband wage variables. 
Traditional labor market institutions may segregate different groups of 
workers by industry, occupation, or activity. Though such arrangements may 
have had at one time relatively little effect on the efficient allocation of 
labor, they may become increasingly inefficient as economic opportunities for 
individuals change more rapidly with modern,economic.growth{Birdsall.an4 
Sabot, forthcoming). Women in particular may be caught in family enterprises 
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and household production functions that are displaced by firms that exploit new 
technological economies of large scale in the organization of production. 
Until women can acquire the requisite schooling and transferable skills to find 
suitable employment in firms in expanding sectors of the modern economy, the 
opportunity value of women's time relative to men's time may decline. 
Fragmentary historical and anthropological evidence supports the view that 
early industrialization reduced the relative value of women's contribution to 
the household. During later stages of industrialization the economic 
contribution of women relative to men has increased (Boserup, 1970; Shorter, 
1975; Goldin, 1980, 1983; T.P. Schultz, 1987b). This cycle may be associated­
with a change in the returns to schooling for women, but historical evidence to 
test this hypothesis is not yet in hand. 
Interactions with Educational Returns 
If returns to education reflect in part the acquired general ability of 
workers to profit from new opportunities, as emphasized by Welch (1970) and 
T.W. Schultz (1975), then investments in enlarging the pool of locally relevant 
technological options and other profitable resource reallocations should spur 
the private returns to education. This pattern of complementarity between 
local research and development activity and the returns to schooling in 
agriculture is a widely noted empirical regularity (Griliches, 1964; Huffman, 
1974; Jamison and Lau, 1982; Evenson, 1986). 
By the same reasoning, it is expected that agricultural extension activity, 
while it raises productivity in specific agricultural functions, it would also 
substitute for farmer schooling, diminishing the productive advantages enjoyed 
by the more educated farmer in exploiting new specific opportunities. 
Schooling's effect on nonmarket production may also be sensitive to the rate of 
growth of knowledge in that specific area of nonmarket production. As effort 
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is expended to diffuse that specific knowledge, the differential advantage 
enjoyed by the educated worker would eventually diminish. The generalized 
knowledge obtained by schooling substitutes (imperfectly) for the specific body 
of functional knowledge disseminated by vocational extension programs. 
Rosenzweig and Schultz- {1982) -found-that the effect:·of.---mother-'-s -education in 
reducing child mortality and·fertility in Colombia was diminished.with 
improvements in local health infrastructure. Barrera (1986) examined child 
height and height-for-weight as measures of child health and nutritional status 
in the Bicol region of the Philippines. He found that gains associated with 
mother's education were larger in communities that lacked health 
infrastructure. In contrast, Strauss (1987) found evidence in a rural Ivory 
Coast survey of complementarity of mother's education and local health 
infrastructure, as they interactively affected child height and 
height-for-weight. T.P. Schultz (1971) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) found 
in Taiwan and the U.S. that schooling of couples and local family planning 
extension activity are substitutes in their effect on fertility reduction. 
Consequently, the least educated gain the most from some types of 
information-extending programs, whether they provide farmers with new 
agricultural inputs or provide housewives with knowledge of health practices or 
family planning techniques. There would seem to be a basis, therefore, for 
analyzing other research and development and information diffusion and 
extension programs to refine our understanding of which activities increase or 
decrease the private nonmarket and market returns to schooling. It may be 
noted that though extension activity may depress-private -returns to schooling, 
they may still be an efficient or cost effective method to increase average 
productivity and to redistribute income more equally. Here again, more 
empirical docwnentation of these patterns ,of substitution:._and complementarity 
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of activities with schooling in low income countries could clarify the 
distributive implications of policy options that focus on educational 
endowments and family welfare.W The .pattern of.productive interactions 
between education and the family's environment and endowments can be estimated 
from reduced-form equations, and -.consequently do not depend on controver.sial 
structural assumptions. 
There appears to be an inverse empirical association·between fertility and 
the resources parents provide each of their children, proxied generally by the 
child's schooling. An interaction between the quality (i.e. schooling) and 
quantity (i.e. number) of children in the parents' budget constraint is a 
widely accepted rationalization for this tradeoff between "quality" and 
quantity of children (Becker and Lewis, 1974). Alternatively, the empirical 
relationship can be interpreted, without imposing a specific structure on the 
budget constraint and family choice process, as indicating parents view child 
quality and quantity as substitutes (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980). In either 
case, estimating without bias the magnitude of this cross-substitution effect 
is difficult, because both outcomes are endogenous to the family's lifetime 
allocation problem. - What exogenous factor can be specified that shifts either 
fertility or' the amount of schooling children receive, allowing the other 
factor to then behaviorally adjust, but not be directly affected by the 
identifying constraint? Only in the natural experiment of "twins" are we 
presented with a clear situation for evaluating the magnitude of this 
quantity-quality substitution effect, and for rural India the data support the 
economists' conjecture (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980). This would imply .that 
family planning programs that lower the cost of averting unwanted births shduld 
encourage parents to invest more in the schooling of each of their children. 
Conversely, extending effective compulsory ~chooling should be expected to 
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contribute to a fertility reduction. Here then is another area in which public 
policy, i.e. family planning, may induce greater investments in schooling, 
presumably by raising the privately perceived rate of return to educating 
children. 
Efficiency and Equity 
A recurrent theme in the literature on economics -of education is a 
discussion of who benefits from the public subsidies extended to education 
(T.W. Schultz, 1972). This policy objective is more salient in low income 
countries where the public subsidy to secondary and higher education can be 
relatively large and these educational levels are filled by the children of the 
upper class (Bhagwati, 1973). For example, in 1962, the Colombian government's 
operating expenses per public school student was five times greater at the 
secondary than at the primary level, and fifty times greater at the higher 
education level than at the primary level (T.P. Schultz, 1968: Table 8). These 
differentials tend to be smaller in South Asia and perhaps even larger in 
Africa, because cost-of-living stipends are often provided to university 
students. The disproportionate size of public subsidies for higher education 
may have begun to decrease in some low income countries, but the inequities of 
the current schemes for financing higher education remain clear in economic 
terms (Minget and Tan, 1985). The distribution of public educational subsidies 
is an area of increasingly active debate. This concern with public financing 
of education and its implications for equity as well as efficiency is outlined 
later in section V; it is reviewed extensively in several recent studies 
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985, World Bank, 1986a). 
- _I 
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V. Nonmarket Production and Schooling 
While the effects of schooling on market earnings are relatively well 
documented, though sometimes subject to uncertainty due to problems of 
measurement and estimation, the evidence is more .recent--and fragmentary on the 
returns to schooling in nonmarket production within the household (Michael, 
1982; Haveman and Wolfe, 1984). In low income countries these benefits .are 
particularly important. This review only surveys the evidence in this field. 
Two other chapters of this volume also address health and fertility 
consequences of education (Behrman and Deolalikar, and Birdsall). 
in the market labor force, holdingMore educated workers tend to work more 
constant for other sources of family income and capital that may combine to 
aenhance their productivity in nonmarket production. As noted earlier, 
married woman is likely to work less time in home production the.greater is her 
This patterneducation, given her husband's education and business capital. 
prevails in most low income surveys of urban areas and in rural areas where 
off-farm employment opportunities for educated women are reasonably developed. 
nonmarket production activities must be curtailed or at least substitutesThus, 
found for the educated woman's nonmarket time. Nonetheless, most.studies 
confirm increased home output in several quantifiable dimensions with a woman's 
schooling, despite the fact that she may actually spend less time in the home. 
Child mortality, for example, is lower for more educated mothers whether or 
not family income or husband's wages and education are also held constant 
(Cochrane et al. 1980; T.P. Schultz, 1980). An additional year of mother's 
schooling, in either rural or urban subpopulations, is associated in many low 
income countries with a 5-10 percent reduction in child mortality, regardless 
of the tendency for these more educated women to reallocate their home time 
toward market activities (Cochrane, et al., 1980). By neglecting education's 
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effect on rural-urban migration and its consequences on child health, these 
studies understate the child health returns to rural schooling of girls (T.P. 
Schultz, 1983). 
Is this empirical association of schooling and child mortality due to (1),, 
the benefit of. the purchased health inputs obtained -from.,the mother's-added 
market earnings, or (2) the enhanced productivity of her remaining time-at 
home, or (3) her improved allocative efficiency in using various health inputs, 
given their prices? Because the household's nonmarket output--child health in 
this case--is consumed directly by the couple, tastes or preferences of the 
couple are relevant to production decisions, unlike the market sector where 
profit maximization alone determines production decisions. Consequently, 
education might modify child health (and fertility) investments by inducing a 
change in tastes, holding constant prices, income and household technology 
(Easterlin, Pollak and Wachter, 1980). To disentangle efficiency, input 
allocation, and taste effects of education on household production, the 
household production technology must be separately identified and estimated 
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983). Lack of sufficient information on this 
technology has slowed progress toward understanding precisely how education 
affects nonmarket outcomes. The total effect of schooling on the outcomes can, 
nonetheless, be estimated by reduced-form like equations that embody both the 
parameters of the utility/demand system and that of the household production 
technology. 
The association between female education and fertility and contraceptive 
behavior is analogous, but more complicated. Education may permit a co~ple to 
achieve more precisely their desired target level of fertility, given 
uncontrolled biological reproductive capacity (i.e. fecundity) .and other .random 
events. A simple association is noted between schooling levels of women and 
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their contraceptive knowledge or use, recent marital fertility rate, and 
cumulative number of births in recent sample surveys from 22 low-income 
countries (United Nations, 1983). Schooling of the women is positively 
correlated with contraceptive knowledge and use in every country and between., 
every pair of (five) schooling levels, controlling for the woman's age and age 
at marriage. This descriptive regression study by the UN does not control, 
however, for the household demand determinants, such as husband's income, 
earnings, assets or land, which often exhibit a positive partial correlation 
with fertility (T.P. Schultz, 1973; Mueller, 1984). Since these income 
variables tend to be positively correlated with wife's schooling, their 
omission as controls for wealth from the above fertility regressions is likely 
to weaken the reported inverse mother schooling-fertility association. 
Regardless of this lapse in specification, the association was inverse in 20 of 
the 22 countries. Cochrane (1979), in an earlier review of the evidence, 
reached similar conclusions, but stressed the non-monotonic simple association 
between women's schooling and their fertility. She noted the tendency for 
fertility, particularly in a few of the poorest rural populations, to increase 
with basic primary schooling and only thereafter fall. The unanswered question. 
is, if controls were included for husband's wealth or land, whether the early 
rising phase of fertility with the woman's education would have been mitigated 
or eliminated, leaving a monotonic negative partial relationship of women's 
education on fertility. 
But to proceed further and assess how education affects nonmarket 
production and thereby influences fertility requires the estimation of 
contraceptive use and contraceptive efficiency equations, conditional on the 
woman's schooling, the couple's endogenous demand for further births, and the 
couple's biological fecundity inferred from past reproductive behavior and 
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performance. Better educated wives in Malaysia and the US appear to know more 
about contraception, and are able to use contraceptive methods more 
efficiently. The more educated couple is better able than a less educated one 
to perceive their reproductive propensities and effectively compensate by 
means of birth control for these differences in f~cundity (Rosenzweig and 
Schultz, 1985, 1987). 
The investments of parents in the "quality" of children are difficult to 
measure, but two outcomes of this nonmarket production process are the health 
and schooling of the children. Child mortality discussed above is the least 
ambiguous indicator of child health investments by parents. Schooling of the 
children is frequently studied as another nonmarket outcome of the family, and 
one in which the education of the mother often appears more important than that 
of the father. Evidence on these issues has been reported for the U.S. (Swift 
and Weisbrod, 1965; Leibowitz, 1974, 1975; Hill and Stafford, 1974; Murnane, et 
al. 1981), Philippines (King and Lillard, 1983), Malaysia (DeTray, 1987), and 
India at the aggregate district level (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977). The 
empirical basis to generalize about the family-level determinants of child 
schooling investments may depend on different regional configurations of the 
family and the distribution of child rearing responsibilities between mother, 
father and extended family. It would be surprising, nonetheless, if parent 
education did not help to explain offspring educational attainment, when 
controls are included for local school facilities, parent assets, and wages 
opportunities.W 
The significance of nonmarket production effects of schooling, particularly 
should not be underrated asthose associated with the education of women, 
factors shaping the development process.ill A major research challenge is to 
these effects of schooling on nonmarket production with greatermeasure 
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precision and to begin to develop methods for measuring the value to these·' 
effects in a way that is more or less commensurate with the estimates of 
private market returns to schooling derived from wage functions . 
. Nonmarket returns to schooling are not generally an additional benefit from 
education over and above the market returns described earlier. Nonmarket 
production is usually obtained by foregoing market income and reallocating}:~ime 
from market to nonmarket production. Just as it is inappropriate to conclude 
that women receive a low return on their schooling because they allocate only a 
small fraction of their time after school to market work, it is incorrect to 
attribute the market rate of return to their schooling and then additionally 
credit their schooling with the noted nonmarket production gains, such as in 
child health, child schooling, and birth control.W 
To the extent that reductions in disease, decreases in fertility, and 
increases in child schooling embody social externalities that benefit other 
members of the society beyond the private family, then an externalities case 
can be made for public subsidization of education that contributes to these 
types of nonmarket production activities. Current research on household 
production suggests that female schooling may, according to this reasoning, 
warrant a larger subsidy than male schooling. But most of the benefits of 
family health improvements, fertility control, and child schooling that are. 
associated with female education are privately captured by families. 
VI. Policy 
Public expenditures on education absorb between two and eight percent of 
the GNP of most countries (World Bank, 1986a; p. 46). The share of school aged 
children is substantially larger in low income than in high income countries, 
because the less developed countries have recently experienced rapid population 
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growth. This age composition may increase the GNP share of educational budgets 
in low income countries, while the income elastic demand for schooling operates 
in the opposite direction. In reality, the share of GNP devoted to education 
is on balance positively related to per capita income, but the relationship 
explains little of the variance across countries (T.P. Schultz, 1985). Many 
poor SubSaharan African countries, for example, spend more than five percent of 
their GNP on public education, whereas this is also the figure reported on 
average for both the Western and Eastern European industrial countries. 
Education is frequently the largest or second largest share of the public 
budget, after defense, claiming between ten to twenty percent of the total 
(World Bank, 1986a). The efficient and equitable allocation of this relatively 
large budget warrants careful scrutiny by economists. 
The educational system influences in complex and subtle ways the long run 
evolution of an economy and society; some of these channels of influence are as 
yet poorly understood. The interdependence among the levels and parts of the 
educational system indicates the need to evaluate the long run implications of 
expansion or change in priorities, for they will have ramifications at many 
points in the public and private sectors (Hicks, 1965). Enrollment levels at 
primary, secondary and higher educational levels must mesh with each other, 
and; as discussed in section II, the educational system is one of the largest 
employers of educated workers in the economy. If the demand for teachers 
outruns the domestic supply, the rising cost of expanding the school system 
hinders the achievement of long run goals. Confronted by the complexity of the 
educational system, forecasting manpower requirements of the economy and 
dynamic educational planning models were developed in the 1960s as a guide to 
policy in developing countries (Harbison and Myers, 1964; Bowles, 1969; Pyatt, 
et al. 1983). But forecasts of the derived demands for educated labor have 
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proven unreliable, particularly at the level of specific occupations and 
technical specialities. They have even been misleading in projecting the 
distribution of enrollment demands among primary, secondary, vocational, and 
higher education (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985). Accumulating evidence 
suggests that private returns to schooling are a useful alternative means for 
monitoring imbalances between the supply of and demand for educated workers in 
an economy. Although these estimates of returns are subject to all the 
difficulties of measurement discussed in section IV, they nonetheless provide a 
means for objectively describing the economic scarcity of many specific levels 
of skills that the educational system produces. 
Imbalances between the educational system and the developing economy have 
been noted by policy advisors, but not all of them are empirically well 
founded. As public expenditures on education increased in the 1960s and 1970s, 
overinvestment in education was attributed a role in creating unemployment 
among the educated and encouraging the inefficient allocation of relatively 
unskilled jobs to overeducated workers (Lewis 1962; Edwards, 1974; Edwards and 
Todaro, 1974). But these subjective interpretations of labor market conditions 
were rarely confirmed by analyses of labor market surveys, where lifetime 
unemployment was below average for the better educated workers (Gregory, 1980; 
Berrry and Sabot, 1984), and wage differentials by education continued to 
reveal substantial market returns to basic primary and general secondary 
education (Table 6). Where imbalances have occurred, the means of financing 
higher education have frequently been a contributing factor as well as the 
mechanisms used for rationing excess private demands for schooling. 
In some countries higher education overexpanded and a "brain drain" 
emerged, as in Colombia in the 1960s (T.P. Schultz, 1968). To deal with the 
international "brain drain", a variety of tax-transfer schemes were proposed 
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(Bhagwati and Partington, 1976; Scott, 1970), but the welfare implications of 
labor mobility between nations are unclear because individual and state 
objectives may conflict, and thus a coordinated international response never 
materialized. The methods of financing higher education may often account for 
the instances of overexpansion in higher education. Tuition fees are often 
minimal and student living stipends are awarded only on the basis of merit or 
examination. The resulting public subsidies per student enrolled in higher 
education have become sufficiently large that there is little likelihood that 
the private sector will evolve complementary higher educational services, even 
in the form of a low cost-low quality system. Private returns to the student 
admitted to the public higher educational system may, as a consequence, be 
substantial, while the social returns are unjustifiably low. When domestic 
university graduates can obtain employment abroad, as may be the case in 
engineering, medicine and technical sciences, these job opportunities can 
augment further the private returns to higher education. Depending on the 
level of remittances of the emigrants to their families and the likelihood that 
they return home and bring with them enhanced productive skills and capital, 
this form of publicly subsidized "brain drain" may erode further the realized 
social returns to public expenditures on higher education. The obvious 
economic solution is to reduce the size of the public subsidy and allow student 
fees to cover a larger share of the costs of higher education. Scholarships 
and educational loans awarded on the basis of family means can still achieve 
redistributive objectives (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1969; T.W. Schultz, 1972; 
Blaug, 1973; Fields, 1974a, 1974b; Psacharopoulos and Wood.hall, 1985; Tan, 
1985; World Bank, 1986a). 
In other countries, such as Brazil, the rapid pace and structure of 
economic growth sustained unusually large returns to higher education in the 
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1970s. Public and private university enrollments increased accordingly 
(Langoni, 1973). Other countries, such as Taiwan, were reluctant to expand 
general university education as rapidly as the private demand for enrollment 
increased for fear of creating unemployment among its educated youth. To deal 
with the excess demand for higher education, college entrance examinations were 
increasing relied upon to ration access to the high quality public subsidized 
universities. But in contrast to other Asian countries, lower quality private 
schools were not allowed to expand and fill the gap. Secondary school 
graduates in Taiwan retake repeatedly the college entrance examinations and 
their failure to enter the labor force in the interim suggests that rationing 
can be an inefficient mechanism for dealing with excess demands for schooling 
(Academic Sinica, 1983). 
Kenya and Tanzania illustrate the consequences of following quite different 
educational expansion policies combined with alternative mechanisms for the 
selection of students. Starting from a similar base in the 1960s, both 
countries achieved nearly universal primary educational attendance by the 
1980s, but public and private secondary schools expanded more rapidly in Kenya 
than in Tanzania with the introduction of substantial school fees .in Kenya to 
finance the secondary school systems. Tanzania alternatively employed a 
"meritocratic" examination system to ration the excess demand for places in the 
secondary school system. These different responses to growing private demand 
for secondary education allowed a larger share of the children of less-educated 
parents to advance into secondary schools in Kenya than in Tanzania (Armitage 
and Sabot, 1986). In other words, the meritocratic examination system screened 
on characteristics that the educated parents were willing and able to produce 
in their offspring, either through greater investments of own time and market 
goods (including higher quality primary schooling), or because of inherited 
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ability. Including the secondary school fees in Kenya, the private rate of 
return to secondary schooling was only marginally lower in Kenya than in 
Tanzania (Knight and Sabot, 1985). Consequently, the increased rate of 
investment in secondary educations in Kenya compared with Tanzania may have 
contributed importantly to the more rapid growth enjoyed by Kenya in the 197
0s, 
though other misguided economic policies in Tanzania probably played a more 
important role in that country's slower growth. The egalitarian intentions 
of 
the Tanzanian meritocratic rationed educational policy frustrated rather tha
n 
facilitated intergenerational mobility and deterred an efficient level of 
schooling investment (Armitage and Sabot, 1986). The market clearing expansi
on 
of secondary schools in Kenya also contributed to a more equal distribution 
of 
income among educational classes, as the relative wage premia for secondary 
school graduates has slowly diminished over time among younger Kenyan worker
s 
(Knight and Sabot, 1981), analogous to figure 3 (p. 16). There are clear 
advantages in terms of efficiency when some of the costs of secondary and 
higher education are borne by students who will thereby gain higher lifetime
 
incomes. Special means-tested financial aids can then be designed to achiev
e a 
wide distribution of subsidized educational opportunities. If these financi
al 
aids can be used by students in either public or private schools, pluralism 
might be maintained and desirable competitive pressure exerted on public (an
d 
private) schools to improve their quality and efficiency. 
Schools in low income countries are often observed to be inefficient (World 
Bank, 1986a). Unfortunately, the task of defining and then measuring 
productive efficiency is complex, and requires agreement on (1) the valuatio
n 
of outputs and (2) on the opportunity cost of inputs, as well as (3) knowled
ge 
of the production technology that defines how the inputs are transformed at 
the 
margin into outputs. Evidence cited in the educational literature to 
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demonstrate school inefficiency is not yet rigorous, and includes 
characteristics such as high dropout rates and low advancement rates (Fuller, 
1986). To interpret such evidence on efficiency requires a measure of student 
productivity associated with exposure to various training regimes. If returns 
to education-fall at the margin after completing four -0r five years, it may not 
pay all students to continue in school to obtain a primary or secondary 
certificate. It could be an efficient use of educational resources to train 
partially many students, but graduate few. The efficiency of a training regime 
depends on the gains in labor market productivity produced in a birth cohort 
passing through the schools, and on how much more public and private resources 
are required to effect a change in the relevant retention and advancement rates 
without altering the standards of the graduates that matter for the labor 
market. Clearly, collecting the necessary figures to measure efficiency in 
schools is difficult. I have not seen an analysis that defines, in this sense, 
the optimal schedule of retention and advancement rates for any country's 
school system. This is not to say, however, that current regimes with low 
attendance rates and frequent repetitions represent an efficient use of either 
the student's or teacher's time. 
Decentralized management of school systems could have advantages in setting 
local enrollment goals and fixing programs priorities. An orderly flow of 
information to the central government would nonetheless be needed to 
rationalize centralized educational subsidies and evaluate national progress. 
Monitoring labor market returns to schooling may also be a function that is 
best performed by the central government. Student fees .might be retained to 
fund local school initiatives, while centrally administered financial aids 
would reduce differential access to schools across economic classes and regions 
of a country. Recommendations to increase sharply school quality in low income 
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countries (World Bank, 1986a) need to be evaluated thoroughly (Zymelman, 1982, 
1985). Local communities may be better positioned than the central government 
to evaluate the trade-offs between expanding enrollments and increasing the 
quality of school offerings. Nonetheless, ·there is an urgent need for more· 
quantitative analysis of how effective schools ·are in-producing valuable-skills 
in low income countries. 
VII. Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed several themes in the economic literature on 
education and development: (1) intercountry evidence of how income, price, and 
demographic constraints govern public expenditures on schools, (2) alternative 
conceptual interpretations of.the relationship between education and income, 
(3) uncertainties underlying the micro statistical evidence on the private and 
social returns to schooling in the labor market, and finally (4) indications of 
the returns to schooling in nonmarket production of child health and 
education, and fertility control. 
To integrate these four themes has not yet occurred. It would entail a 
firm idea of the factors that initiated the modern disequilibrium in education. 
What change in the institutional or technological environment created the 
derived demands for more educated labor? How did these conditions increase the 
private returns to schooling, encouraging the increased investment of private 
resources in schooling and public expenditures on education throughout the 
world. As these resources in schooling increased, they enlarged the pool of 
educated workers which operates, other things equal, to reduce returns to 
schooling, until a new equilibrium rate of return is established that more or 
less equals the opportunity cost of diverting public and private investment 
from the formation of further physical capital. It cannot be said, with any 
precision, how far the expansion of education can expect to proceed in any 
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particular country before demands for educated labor are satisfied and returns 
decrease to "normal" levels. A dynamic model of both the demand for and supply 
of educated workers is needed to answer these questions. -Oiven the time lags 
between production of students, their entry. into the labor force, and the 
determination of their lifetime wage levels, ·it may be possible in the future 
to use the historical record to· form estimates of a recursive-model of 
education and development than could answer-questions such as.these. The 
challenge of the field is to clarify the origins and dynamic structure of such 
a model of education and development, and though speculatory theory is 
beginning to emerge (Lucas, 1985), we have a long way to go. 
This paper surveys several limited empirical regularities and provides 
economic frameworks to help interpret the meaning of these patterns, and to 
focus attention on many unresolved problems in model specification and 
empirical implementation. It will prove impossible in practice to deal with 
many of these complicating issues simultaneously, and hence assigning priority 
to questions for further research reveals my intuition on which issues are most 
important to advance our understanding of education in the process of modern 
economic growth. 
The wage function is a powerful device for swnmarizing data on individual 
wages or earnings. Even the most simplified semi-logarithmic wage function, 
conditioned on years of schooling and a quadratic in postschooling years of 
experience, accounts for a remarkable one-quarter to one-half of the log 
variance in male wages across most national labor markets. There are few 
internationally replicated regularities in the social sciences that have this 
descriptive power at the individual level, and also have the intuitive appeal 
of providing a rough approximation of the market pecuniary rate of returns 
earned from schooling, viewed as an economic investment in human capital. 
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Once economists had developed a conceptual framework for inferring the 
private rate of return to schooling, estimates of returns were derived for 
different types and levels of schooling and for different racial groups. 
Returns to qualitative improvements in the educational system are also 
estimated frequently, but findings. as to.' the -returns. to ~various ..:4imet1sions of. 
school quality differ markedly across studies. Returns to school quality are 
approximated by measuring variation in schooling inputs per student across 
schools in a single labor market. Variation in input use is then related to 
the earnings of pupils across regions, holding constant years of schooling 
(e.g. Welch, 1966). Since observed variation in years of schooling is 
generally positively associated with the quality of schooling across schools, 
the estimates of returns to school years tend to decrease as controls are added 
to the wage function for the qualitative dimensions of the schools. The more 
parsimonious specification of returns to only "years" of schooling implicitly 
assumes that changes in years of schooling will parallel as in past changes in 
quality, and measured returns capture both the prevailing quantity and quality 
variation in the population. When the single proxy for educational inputs 
(i.e. years) is supplemented by other measures of input mixes, there is a basis 
for predicting how changes in years of schooling and the input mix will 
subsequently influence the earnings capacity of educated workers. 
Wage and earnings functions stratified by sex reveal that relative wage 
differentials by schooling are of about the same magnitude for women in the 
labor force as they are for men. Because the sample of women reporting wages 
is not representative of all women in the population, a sample selection bias 
could affect these estimates of schooling returns for women. Too few studies 
have addressed this important empirical issue to draw any firm conclusions. 
Nor have many studies collected reliable data on the net earnings of 
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self-employed workers and analyzed them appropriately to clarify whether 
returns to schooling in this self-selected segment of the labor force are the 
same as among employees. Clearly farmers recoup substantial income from their 
education, and there is no obvious reason why the self-employed in 
nonagricultural activities should fare differently. But appropriate .statis~i~l 
evidence is not yet in hand. 
Finally, schooling raises the productivity of individuals in rionmarket 
production. The schooling of parents affects the level of home production of 
health, nutrition, mobility, fertility control, and child schooling. 
Decomposing the sources of these changes requires the identification and 
structural estimation of household production functions and input demand 
equations. The gains in household production attributable to a mother's 
schooling are important for social welfare and should not continue to be 
neglected by economists. The topic of this chapter will remain incomplete 
until it is possible to clarify the origins and trace through the consequences 
of these nonmarket returns to women's schooling. A microeconometric framework 
for such studies of household production and behavior has been proposed 
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983). Current progress in implementing such analyses 
is limited by the scarcity of suitably detailed longitudinal or retrospective 
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1/As Kuznets observed, "the ine
scapable conclusion is that the 
direct 
contribution of man-hours and c
apital accumulation would hardly
 account for 
more than a tenth of the rate o
f growth in per capita product -
- and probably 
less" (1966:81). Since man-hou
rs per capita tended to decline 
by 2 to 3 
percent per decade, relatively 
rapid accumulation of capital co
uld not provide 
a satisfactory explanation for 
sustained periods of modern econ
omic growth. 
One may recall the labor share 
of national income was increasin
g from the 19th 
to the 20th centuries from some
what more than half to about thr
ee quarters in 
the 14 industrially developed c
ountries for which Kuznets had l
ong-term 
economic series. 
YThe literature on economics o
f education is vast, and much of
 it is relevant 
to low income countries. For d
ifferent perspectives on this fi
eld, consult the 
surveys by T.W. Schultz (1963), 
Blaug (1973, 1976, 1985), Rosen 
(1977, 1985), 
Griliches (1977), Psacharopoulo
s (1973, 1981, 1985), Psacharopo
ulos and 
Woodhall (1985), and Willis (19
87). 
1/I appreciate that J. Behrman drew
 my attention to the fact that i
n the period 
1960 to 1981 one country did ind
eed report a decline in expected
 years of 
schooling. In El Salvadore this
 figure declined from 5.63 to 5
.06 years 
The 1986 World
according to the 1984 World Dev
elopment Report (Table 25). 
Development Report (Table 29), h
owever, reports even in El Salva
dore an 
increase in expected schooling f
rom 1965 to 1983 from 6.04 to 6
.18 years. 
Ysection II draws on Schultz (
1985). 
2/The gap in expected education
 and life at birth between the l
owest income 
countries (excluding India and 
China in the World Bank categor
ies) and the high 
income industrial market econom
ies decreased markedly in the la
st two decades. 
Life expectation stood at about
 43 and 71 years in 1960, and ha
d increased to 
roughly 51 and 75 years by 1982 
in these two groups of countries
, respectively. 
Expected years of schooling, on
 the other hand, increased for t
hese two groups 
of countries from almost 3 and 
11.5 years in 1960, to almost 6 
and 13.3 years 
in 1982, or from one-to-four to 
one-to-two. These achievements 
were recorded 
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despite the fact that income (GNP) per capita in constant prices grew in the
 
same period three times faster in the high income countries than it did in t
his 
lowest income group of countries. These illustrative figures are drawn from
 
World Development Report 1984, World Bank Staff, Oxford University Press, 19
84, 
Tables 1, 23, and 25. See also Preston's (1980) comparisons of life expecta
­
tion across more uniform and reliable data from a smaller number of countrie
s. 
There are differences between and limitations of such synthetic summary 
measures of health and education. The schooling in high and low income 
countries (as suggested in Tables 1 and 2) may be of increasingly disparate 
quality, so the gap in quality-adjusted years may not be decreasing though t
he 
gap in years is. Analogously, the gap between the quality of life (however 
that is measured) in high and low income countries may be widening, undermin
ing 
consideration of the expectation of life as an overall indicator of health a
nd 
There is also the bounded nature of both life expectation and yearsvitality. 
of education which may imply a narrowing gap as many countries aproach that 
boundary. 
£/See explanatory footnotes to Table A-1. 
l/ The most comprehensive comparison of rate of return studies is that by 
Psacharopoulos (1973, 1981, 1985). Differences in methodology across these 
summarized country studies limits the precise comparability of the return 
calculations. 
~/The political process may not assign everyone's vote an equal weight, 
however. For example, urban populations in many low income countries appea
r to 
exercise greater influence on public sector decisions than do dispersed rura
l 
populations (Lipton, 1977). Without data on the distribution of income, pu
blic 
services, or taxes across subgroups within countries, it is not fruitful to 
speculate further here on the distributional implications of how this politi
cal 
process works. 
~/ Equation (11) may be rewritten in logarithms: 
ln(E/P) - ln(S/P) + ln(T/S) + ln(C/T) + ln(E/C) 
and regressions would be calculated of the following form at each level of 
schooling: 
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ln(E/P) P11 + P12ln Y + P13ln Px + P14Z 
ln(S/P) P21 + P22ln Y + P23ln Px + fi24Z 
ln(T/S) P31 + P32ln Y + fi33ln Px + P34Z 
ln(C/T) fi41 + fi42ln Y + fi43ln Px + fi44Z 
ln(E/C) Ps1 + Ps2ln y + fi53ln Px + fi54Z 
The adding up of component effects implies that 
for i = 1, ... ,4.
P1i =.t ~iJ-
!Q/ It may be argued that the use of foreign exchange (FX) rates in 1969-71 to 
translate GNP from local currencies into the common unit of dollars gives 
insufficient weight to nontraded commodities. The tendency is to exaggerate 
differences across countries in real consumer income per adult. Recent work to 
construct a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis for comparing incomes across 
countries by Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982) is built on a sample of coun­
tries for which price indexes were constructed and then generalized and revised 
to apply to other countries by Summers and Heston (1984). For example, FX 
translated GNP per adult is forty-three times larger in the U.S. than in India 
in 1970, whereas the PPP real income per adult difference is only thirteen to 
one. Consumer welfare may be better approximated by the PPP income deflator 
and therefore the PPP deflated figures were used in reestimating the schooling 
equations reported in this paper. In general, PPP income elasticities of 
school expenditures increased by as much as a quarter, as would have been ex­
pected since the sample variance in log PPP incomes is markedly less than the 
variance in log FX incomes. Price elasticities were reduced somewhat, suggest­
ing that some of the differences in the relative price of teacher salaries are 
captured in the PPP adjustment procedure. No systematic changes occurred in 
the coefficients on relative size of school aged cohorts, nor were the esti­
mated effects of urbanization noticeably changed by this substitution of one 
measure of real GNP for the other. Substantive conclusions were not par­
ticularly sensitive, therefore, to this choice of procedure for translating GNP 
across countries into common welfare units. 
ll/ The disturbances in the equation determining current demand for schooling 
that would affect today's wages of teachers might also be correlated with the 
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unexplained disturbances in the equation determining enrollment rates ten years 
earlier, such as might arise from a persistent country-specific unobserved 
effect. This form of error structure would imply that the lagged enrollment 
variable was not actually exogenous to the wage equation. The two-stage esti­
mates based on the lagged enrollment instrument would then be subject to the 
classical simultaneous equation bias and also would be inconsistent. Estimates 
were calculated without the lagged enrollment as an instrument and the 
coefficient estimates of the price elasticities did not change appreciably, 
though their standard errors tended to increase. See also footnote 13 below. 
WAn analogous errors-in-variable bias occurs in the study of labor supply, 
where earnings are divided by hours worked to obtain a wage rate that is 
specified by theory as a determinant of hours. 
13/The implicit primary and secondary school logarithmic wage equations for 
teachers were estimates as conditioned on the secondary school enrollment rate, 
income per adult and proportion of the population urban, all of which ex­
planatory variables were evaluated ten years earlier: 
ln WPt = -1.84 - .349 ln Est-lO + .355 ln GNP/At-10 - .808U 
(3.38)(6.22) (4.30) (2.67) 
n = 186 
-.931 - .646 ln Est-lO + .305 ln GNP/At-10 - l.25U 
(1.18) (8.25) (2.61) (3.22) 
n = 139 R2 - .601 
where Est-lO refers to the secondary school enrollment proportion ten years 
ago, GNP/At-10 indicates GNP per adult (age 15 to 65) measured ten years ear­
lier, Ut-10 is the urban proportion of the population ten years ago, and Wpt or 
'Wst are the school current expenditures per primary or secondary school teacher 
divided by GNP per adult today. 
Wwealthier countries may have lower labor force participation rates in ages 
15 to 24, in part because the returns to schooling are relatively attractive 
for these youth. Thus, this available productive resource of the time of 
students is being saved and invested, though it is not fully counted in 
national income accounts. At the other end of the life cycle, wealthier 
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countries tend to report lower participation rates, at least for males after 
age 55. In other words, earlier retirement from the market labor force occurs 
at higher income levels. The time of the elderly is also a productive resource 
available to the society, but it is used increasingly for direct consumption 
(e.g. leisure) as per capita incomes rise. The bias in my measure of GNP per 
adult arises because the market value of leisure in retirement and the time of 
students is not included in GNP and thus differentially understates the real 
value of national factor income in wealthier societies that invest in more 
schooling and consume more of their life cycle budget of time in retirement 
activities. 
illFrom equation (6) the coefficient on the relative price or teacher wage 
variable in the expenditure function is b2 - a(~+ 1), and thus the estimated 
price elasticity,~= (b2/a) - 1. The sample mean of a is .82. 
WEconomies of scale in producing school services might be distinguished at 
three levels: (1) with the size of the national educational system, (2) with 
the size of the school measured in terms of its number of full time teachers, 
and (3) with the size of the teacher's span of control or student-teacher 
ratio. The importance of (1) in primary and secondary school systems was as­
sumed at the outset to be negligible. The number of primary schools is re­
ported in the 1984 UNESCO Yearbook. If the system's average school size (i.e. 
log of teachers per school) is added to equation (6), one might expect this 
added scale variable to diminish the coefficient on urbanization, if larger ur­
ban schools realized economies that reduced unit costs. In a sample of 60 
countries for which these data are recently available, school size is associ­
ated with greater expenditures per child due to higher teacher-student ratios 
and higher current outlays per teacher. The coefficients on urbanization are 
not reduced in magnitude by the addition of school size. Consolidation econo­
mies, however, could remain important at the secondary level, but no data were 
found to test this conjecture. 
A plausible interpretation of this pattern would presume that there are 
economies in using teachers in the larger scale urban schools and perhaps com­
pensating amenities in urban areas that teachers value, such as attractive em­
ployment opportunities for teachers when schools are not in session. In fact, 
urban teachers are probably better trained than rural ones in most countries, 
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so qualitatively one would expect to otherwise see higher teacher costs in 
urban school systems. 
Wstandardized test comparisons do confirm that spending far less per student 
in low income countries is associated with lower standardized test scores 
(Heyneman and Loxley, 1983). 'What-is-not clear is whether marginal gains from 
additions to school quality and quantity that can be purchased with marginal 
increments in educational expenditures raise the market wages of existing 
students by more than the amount those resources would accomplish if they 
extended education to a larger number of students as discussed in the next 
section of the paper. One suggestive study that draws this conclusion for 
Brazil is Behrman and Birdsall (1983). 
lllReturns to education may not increase with modern economic growth because of 
limited regional and occupational mobility rewarding individuals on the basis 
of their skills and education. Public policies may also have failed to 
encourage technological change through adaptive research and development. Fi­
ornally, the absence of competitive domestic factor and product markets, 
may have eroded the incentivesdistorting trade and foreign exchange regimes, 
to invest in education or skewed the distribution of income so as to discourage 
broadly based educational programs. These possibilities cannot be explored 
here. 
19/ There are several possible reasons for divergence. First, the model is fit 
to a pooled combination of cross section data from several time periods, and 
not to just the 1965-1975 time series changes within countries. Second, the 
sample of countries for which the 1965-1975 comparisons can be performed is 
A third reasonmore restricted than the sample used in estimating the model. 
is, of course, the omission or misspecification of explanatory factors. On the 
other hand, this test is less strong than it might appear, because it is based 
Though the within country changes are not the basison overlapping samples. 
for the reported estimates, repeated observations on these same countries do 
represent about a fifth of the pooled cross section sample used for the 
estimation of the original model. 
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20/rf there are additional private direct costs of schooling, these are assumed 
to be offset by part-time employment by the student. Obviously, where students 
incur large direct costs, private returns are overstated by n and conversely 
where private stipends are available for all students, such as in Francophone 
Africa for higher education, the private returns are understated in this 
Mincerian earnings function. Clearly, this specification is a simple 
approximation, which fits reasonably well many sources of data. Tests of 
specification are rarely performed but some that have been reported do not 
reject this semi-log form (Heckman and Polachek, 1974). 
21/rf z had a proportionate effect, a3, on wages in equation (11), its omission 
would bias the OLS estimate of r to the extent that z ands were partially 
correlated in the sample, i.e. cov(z)/var(s) >o. Thus, if z were height and 
cov(z,s) were zero, the bias due to omitting a factor affecting wages would not 
affect estimates of educational returns. Alternatively, if more able 
individuals in each birth cohort were selected to obtain more schooling, 
cov(z,s) > 0, and more able workers received higher wages given schooling, the 
omission of ability from the wage equation (11) would bias upward the OLS 
estimate of r due to the misspecification of the wage equation by 
a3cov(zs)/var(s) (Griliches, 1957, 1977). 
Wif the labor supply equation is jointly estimated with the wage equation, 
the gain in earnings associated with education can be decomposed into direct 
wage effects plus income and compensated wage effects on labor supply. The 
case could be made for focusing analysis on the direct wage and indirect income 
effects of wages on hours as the benefits to education, holding constant for 
the loss of leisure induced by the compensated change in relative wage. If the 
income effect of the wage change is indeed zero, as is frequently estimated, 
then the effect of schooling on wage rates is a satisfactory approximation for 
the total private market benefits to schooling. 
W Cases have been described in the literature, such as Brazil in the 1960s 
and 1970s, where rapid modern economic growth created large rents for well 
educated workers. Before the rapidly expanding educational system of Brazil 
could catch up to these demands for higher educated workers, the private 
returns to secondary and higher education reach high levels (Langoni, 1973; 
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Fishlow, 1973). But these rents were reduced among the younger birth cohorts· 
whose relative supplies of schooling increased. High returns persisted, 
however, for some older educated workers for whom the more plentiful young 
educated workers were apparently poor substitutes. Conversely, foreign exchange 
crises in Colombia were associated with depressed wage premia for younger 
university graduates in Bogota in 1965 (Schultz, 1968). As the import 
dependent modern sectors of Colombia revived in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
private returns to university training rebounded (Psacharopoulos, 1981; Fields 
and Schultz, 1982). The point is that the business cycle may perturb 
substantially the apparent cross-sectional returns to schooling in the short 
run (Kniesner et al., 1978), while the appropriate criteria for a long-run 
human capital investment should be returns averaged over short-run business 
cycles and not confounded with other short run changes that occur cyclically, 
such as changes in the relative size of birth cohorts entering the labor force 
(Freeman and Bloom, 1985). 
lliMincer introduced the logarithm of weeks worked to explain the logarithm of 
annual earnings (1974: Table 5.1, p. 92). This specification should be avoided 
except where weeks worked is treated as endogenous and estimated suitably. 
WJob turnover and quit behavior is also a decreasing function of education 
for men and women (Weiss, 1984; Kiefer, 1985; Donohue, 1985). These aspects of 
job search and mobility might be interpreted as increasing the private returns 
to schooling. Social returns might also be realized if the labor market in the 
aggregate sustained a lower level of turnover as schooling levels increased. 
Private returns may thus differ systematically over the business cycle with the 
changing distribution and level of unemployment (Kniesner et al., 1978). 
WAnother serious problem is the treatment of unpaid family workers. This 
group should be imputed wages for their labors in family enterprise. Kuznets 
(1959, 1966) made various working assumptions to estimate factor shares. C. 
Chiswick (1977) has proposed a method that uses the survey detail available ~t 
the household level. Other studies examine income distributions and impute an 
opportunity value to the time of unpaid family workers. (Fishlow, 1972, 1974). 
However, even if a satisfactory wage could be imputed to unpaid family workers, 
few data sets report the number of hours these workers contribute to family 
enterprise. See for example C. Chiswick, 1973. 
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WFor example Armitage and Sabot (1986) report an interesting analysis of wage 
relationships in the manufacturing sector of Tanzania for men and women. In 
this country in 1967 this elite sector employs 1 percent of the male labor 
force and .05 percent of the female labor force. Can one assume the same type 
and magnitude of selection bias would be present for men and women, so that the 
evidence of wage differences in manufacturing between men and women could be 
accepted as indicative of broader patterns in sex differences in wages. 
WPrice levels tend to be higher in urban than rural areas primarily because 
of housing and food prices. Health and educational services that are publicly 
provided may be an exception to this pattern. There are few countries where 
regional price indices are readily available over time. 
WThe average private returns to schooling of Colombian women summarized in 
Table 7 are much less sensitive than were those for men to the migration bias. 
This is probably due to the much greater female market labor force participa­
tion in urban than rural areas of Colombia, (i.e. 25 versus 10 percent of the 
women over age 25 to 54), whereas for men at these ages the difference in labor 
force participation is negligible between urban and rural areas (Schultz, 1981: 
Table 7.5). Birdsall and Behrman (1984) control for origin and destination 
effects on earnings in Brazil and find different results. It is difficult for 
me to interpret their findings, although Brazil is different from many 
countries in having large differences between rural and urban areas in the 
northeast and elsewhere in the country. 
W 11 The extent of the market" limits the amount of human capital individuals 
invest in themselves, according to Becker (1964, p. 52). Because women often 
prepare to work both in the home and market, they are less likely to invest as 
do men in specialized market skills. The limitations of the household market 
circumscribe the opportunities for specialized investments open to women, and 
help to account, in Becker's view, for fewer US women than men graduating from 
college (p. 101). 
illThe family labor supply model is based on the household demand framework 
where the wife's labor supply is conditioned on the wage rate of her husband or 
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other family members, the family's nonearned income, and an exogenous proxy for 
her permanent wage opportunities (e.g. education and age). Ashenfelter and 
Heckman (1974) examine only couples for whom the wife and husband work for a 
wage, and they simply treat her actual wage as though it were exogenous. The 
papers edited by Smith (1980) explore other procedures for dealing with sample 
selection for wage earners and wage imputation for nonworking women. 
WThe direction of such a bias is not prescribed by the selection model and 
empirical evidence is scarce. Suppose an unobserved trait, called taste for 
market production, influenced positively the likelihood that a woman is 
observed to work for wage and to get an education. Then the direct correlation 
of education and wages among working women will be upward biased even if this 
taste has no independent effect on labor productivity. But if women's 
education increases the likelihood that they will retire from the labor market 
when their children are of preschool age (Leibowitz, 1975), then the bias could 
change direction at different stages in the life cycle. 
W Caldwell (1979), for example, believes that in Africa the provision of 
health facilities widens differentials in health status by education class, for 
only the educated mothers know how to use effectively the over burdened public 
health facilities. 
Mt/This intergenerational effect of education could be interpreted as arising 
from at least three distinct mechanisms: a genetic component of ability proxied 
by education, a disproportionate productivity in educating one's child, and an 
acquired taste for having children become like oneself. 
35/other nonmarket benefits not considered here are in spouse selection and 
subsequent marital stability (Becker, et al. 1977; Boulier and Rosenzweig, 
1984; Montgomery, 1985). Reduced marital dissolution might also influence 
child investments. The reduction in crime (Ehrlich, 1975) is often cited as a 
source of private and social gains. Political behavior and the functioning of 
democracy are also often linked to schooling as are the social benefits of a 
more equal personal distribution of income. These issues were beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
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36/This would appear to be the implication of Woodhall (1973) and 
Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) where the nonmarket effects are cited as 
added support for the very high returns to women's schooling. 
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